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INTRODUCTION

Since 1970, section 112 of the Clean Air Act (the Act) has
required the EPA to establish national emission standards for haz-

2005] Authority to Delist "Low-Risk" Sources of Carcinogens 77
ardous air pollutants (NESHAPs),l or air toxics. 2 Section 112 regulates all stationary sources such as factories, power plants, and
refineries that emit listed air toxics? The Act currently lists 187
different types of regulated hazardous air pollutants, some of
which are carcinogens and some of which are non-carcinogens that
pose other serious health risks.4
In section 112 of the 1970 Amendments to the Act,S Congress
mandated that the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) establish health-based6 standards for air toxics that
1 The 1970 Act defined a hazardous air pollutant as "an air pollutant to which no ambient air quality standard is applicable and which in the judgment of the Administrator [of
the EPA] causes, or contributes to ... an increase in mortality or an increase in serious
irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness." 42 U.S.c. § 7412(a)(I) (1970).
2 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECfION AGENCY, PUB. NO. EPAl4511K-98-001, TAKING TOXICS
OUT OF AIR 1,2 (1998) [hereinafter TAKING TOXICS OUT] (discussing health impacts of
HAPs), available at http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/takingtoxics; Patricia Ross McCubbin,
Amending the Clean Air Act to Establish Democratic Legitimacy for the Residual Risk Program, 22 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1 (2003) (noting that Mary Jean Sawey, David R. HoJtgrave,
and John D. Graham in their article, The Potential Health Benefits of Controlling Hazardous Air Pollutants, 1 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 473, 477 (1990), refer interchangeably to "hazardous air pollutants" and "air toxies"). Some courts or commentators use the abbreviation
"HAPs" for hazardous air pollutants. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 979 (D.C.
Cir. 2004).
3 42 U.S.c. § 7412(a)(3) (2000) (defining "stationary source" of hazardous air pollutants
as having same definition as that found in Section l11(a): "any building, structure, facility,
or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant"). The hazardous emissions of
mobile sources, such as cars, trucks, and buses, are beyond the scope of this article. See 42
U.S.c. § 7521(1) (addressing mobile source-related air toxics).
4 In the 1990 Amendments, Congress initially listed 189 hazardous air pollutants, but the
EPA, acting under the authority of section 112(b)(3)(C), later deleted caprolactam and
most recently delisted ethylene glycol monobutyl ether. See 42 U.S.c. §§ 7412(b)(I),
7412(b)(3)(c) (1994) (listing 189 hazardous air pollutants and giving the EPA authority to
delete air toxics if it concludes that substance poses no adverse effects to human health or
environment); McCubbin, supra note 2, at 1 n.l (stating that the EPA delisted caprolactam
and that 188 chemicals were listed in 2003); Petition To Delist of Ethylene Glycol
Monobutyl Ether, 69 Fed. Reg. 96,320 (Nov. 29, 2004) (delisting ethylene glycol monobutyl
ether (EGBE) from section 112(b)(I) list of air toxics, but continuing regulation of EGBE
as volatile organic compound).
5 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1685 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 7412).
6 See Alan Jay Goldberg, Note, Toward Sensible Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants
Under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 613 n.ll (1988) (stating,
"The term 'health-based' ... is used to refer to those factors relating exclusively to the risk
posed to human health by ingestion of a given pollutant."). Some courts or commentators
would characterize section 112 as a "risk-based" statute regulating air emissions based on
their likely impacts on human health. See, e.g., Sierra Club, 353 F.3d at 979 ("EPA followed a risk-based analysis to set emission standards under the statute, meaning that the
EPA considered levels of HAPs at which health effects are observed, factored in an 'ample
margin of safety to protect the public health,' and set emission restrictions accordingly.")
(emphasis in original).
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provide "an ample margin of safety to protect the public health
from such hazardous air pollutant. "7 However, the statute failed to
provide adequate guidance on how the EPA should interpret or
apply the "ample margin" standard. 8 Because the EPA regulated
only seven air toxics from 1970 until 1990,9 Congress in the 1990
Amendments to the ActIO substantially revised section 112 to
authorize the EPA to use a primarily technology-based l l regulatory
scheme to reduce air toxics. 12 The 1990 Amendments require the
EPA to issue emissions standards based on the "maximum achievable control technology" (MACT) standard for each category or
subcategory of major 13 sources of air toxics. 14 Subsection
112(c)(9)(B), however, authorizes the EPA under certain conditions to delete, or "delist," a category or subcategory of sources
from MACT standards if all sources in the category or subcategory
are "low-risk. "15
7 § 112, 84 Stat. at 1685; Bradford C. Mank, What Comes After Technology: Using an
"Exceptions Process" to Improve Residual Risk Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 13
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 263, 267-68 (1994); McCubbin, supra note 2, at 3-4, 6-7; Arnold W.
Reitze, Jr. & Randy Lowell, Control of Hazardous Air Pollution, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REv. 229, 237 (2001).
8 See 3 GERRARD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 17.06[1][a][i] (2005).
9 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Report of the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, H.R. REp. No. 101-490, at 150 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 House Report]
(explaining failure of section 112 as caused by several factors, including "fault with the
basie legislation, fault with its administration, fault with the public understanding, and fault
[with] the way the legislation has been working to protect the public health"); Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1989: Report of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, S.
REP. No. 101-228, at 3 (1989), as reprinted in 1990 V.S.C.C.A.N. 3385 [hereinafter 1989
Senate Report] ("Very little has been done since the passage of the 1970 [Act] to identify
and control hazardous air pollutants."); Sierra Club, 353 F.3d at 979.
10 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified in
various parts of 42 V.S.c. §§ 7401-7671(q)).
11 See 42 V.S.c. § 7412(f)(1)(B).
12 See 1990 House Report, supra note 9, at 144 (stating purpose of 1990 Amendments to
Section 112 is to "strengthen and expand the Clean Air Act" through a "technologybased ... program"); 1989 Senate Report, supra note 9, at 133 (stating there is a "broad
consensus that the program to regulate [air toxies] under section 112 of the Clean Air Act
should be restructured to provide EPA with authority to regulate ... with technology-based
standards") (emphasis added); Sierra Club, 353 F.3d at 979; Theodore L. Garrett & Sonya
D. Winner, A Clean Air Act Primer: Part II, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,235, 10,246 (1992).
13 The Act defines a "major source" of air toxics as a source releasing at least 10 tons
per year (tpy) of any single hazardous air pollutant or 25 tons of any combination of such
pollutants. 42 V.S.c. § 7412(a)(1).
14 42 V.S.c. §§ 7412(d)(2)-(3) (defining and requiring the EPA to promulgate "maximum available control technology" (MACT) for all major sources of air toxics); Sierra
Club, 353 F.3d at 980.
15 42 V.S.c. §§ 7412(c)(9)(B)(i)-(ii).
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This article will focus on the scope of the EPA's authority to
delist categories and subcategories of sources, especially those
emitting carcinogens. The plain language of subsection
112(c)(9)(B) provides different requirements for carcinogenic and
non-carcinogenic air toxics. Under subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(ii), the
EPA has authority to exempt either categories or subcategories of
sources emitting non-carcinogenic air toxics from MACT standards
as long as the EPA substitutes standards that are "adequate to protect public health within an ample margin of safety" and that will
cause "no adverse environmental effect. "16 By contrast, subsection
112(c)(9)(B)(i) explicitly provides the EPA with the authority to
exempt from MACT standards only whole categories of carcinogenic sources, provided that no source in the category emits air
toxics causing "a lifetime risk of cancer greater than one-in-onemillion to the individual in the popUlation who is most exposed to
emissions of such pollutants from the source."17 The subsection
does not explicitly authorize the EPA to exempt a subcategory of
sources releasing carcinogenic chemicals. The omission of the term
"subcategory" in subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) is potentially very significant and may limit the EPA's authority to delist a subcategory
of carcinogenic sources from a larger category of such sources.
Even though subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i)'s statutory language
only authorizes the EPA to exempt whole categories of carcinogenic sources, the EPA recently published a rule that purports to
use that very subsection to delist a subcategory of "low-risk"
sources. On July 30, 2004, the EPA published a final rule for the
plywood and composite wood industries (PCWP). The rule established MACT standards for approximately 223 sources that release
potentially carcinogenic air toxics, including formaldehyde. 1s
See 42 v.s.c. § 7412(c)(9)(B)(ii).
See 42 v.s.c. § 7412(c)(9)(B)(i).
18 National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Plywood and Composite
Wood Products; Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Timber Products
Point Source Category; List of Hazardous Air Pollutants, Lesser Quantity Designations,
Source Category List, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,944, 45,996-45,997 (July 30, 2004) [hereinafter
PCWP Rule] (stating that one "commenter's sensitivity analysis showed that formaldehyde
and acetaldehyde made up the bulk of the cancer risk."). In its 1996 National Air Toxies
Assessment, whieh examined the impact of thirty-two of the thirty-three most harmful air
toxics in urban areas and is the Agency's most comprehensive examination of air toxics,
the EPA identified formaldehyde as a "probable" human carcinogen and estimated that it
posed an upper-bound lifetime cancer risk exceeding ten-in-one-million to more than
twenty-five million people, with only the known carcinogens benzene and chromium posing such potentially high risks. See EPA, Office of Air and Radiation, National Air Toxies
Assessment, Estimated Risk, Summary of Results (2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/
ttnlatw/nata/risksum.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2005) [hereinafter National Air Toxics
16
17
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However, partly in response to an industry petition and partly in
response to its own initiative, the EPA also established an exemption that could apply to over half of PCWP sources. Specifically,
the EPA used its subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) authority to "delist"
and treat as a separate subcategory "low-risk" PCWP sources that
release small amounts of air toxics. 19 The agency justified this
exemption on the grounds that these PCWP facilities posed such
low risks that the PCWP MACT standards were unnecessary and
too costly.20 During 2003 and 2004, the EPA also adopted or considered similar exceptions under subsection 112(c)(9)(B) for other
source categories releasing air toxics. 21 The EPA's claim that it has
the authority to exempt subcategories of so-called "low-risk" carcinogenic sources is significant because it could be used to exempt
thousands of sources governed by MACT standards in dozens of
industries. It would also give the Agency authority to exempt individual sources from MACT, an authority that Congress in 1990
explicitly refused to grant to the Agency.22
Assessment, Estimated Risk, Summary of Results]. The PCWP Rule also found that acrolein and formaldehyde from PCWP sources could pose significant acute non-cancer risks in
high doses, with acrolein probably posing the greatest possible non-cancer risk. The EPA
stated that "only acrolein and formaldehyde showed the potential for acute exposures of
any concern." PCWP Rule, supra at 45,950; see also PCWP Rule supra at 45,996-97 (stating that one commenter's sensitivity analysis showed that "[u]nder all scenarios, acrolein
contributed the most non-cancer risk.").
19 See PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,944, 45,955-56.
20
21

[d.
See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Chlorine and Hydro-

chloric Acid Emissions from Chlorine Production, 68 Fed. Reg. 70,948, 70,951 (Dec. 19,
2003) (to be promulgated at 40 c.F.R. pt. 63) (using subsection 112(c)(9) authority to de list
non-mercury cell chlorine production subcategory from the list of major sources subject to
MACT standards); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Stationary Combustion Turbines, 69 Fed. Reg. 51,184 (Aug. 18,2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 63) (invoking subsection 112(c)(9) authority to stay the imposition of MACT standards
for two subcategories of stationary combustion turbines); National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants for Stationary Combustion Turbines, 69 Fed. Reg. 18,327 (April
7,2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (proposing to delist four subcategories from the
Stationary Combustion Thrbines source category MACT standard).
22 See Natural Resources Defense Council & Environmental Integrity Project, Petition
for Reconsideration, In the Matter of the Final Rule: National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants: Plywood and Composite Wood Products Effluent Limitations
Guidelines and Standards for the Timber Products Point Source Category: List of Hazardous Air Pollutants, Lesser Quantity Designations, Source Category List OAR-2003-0048,
A-98-44 (Sept. 28, 2004) [hereinafter PCWP Petition for Reconsideration], available at
http://www.4c1eanair.org/membersicommitteeiairtoxics/PetitionforReconsiderationFINAL.pdf, at 38-56 (last visited Dec. 2, 2005) (arguing that Congress in 1990 explicitly
refused to grant to the EPA the authority to exempt individual sources from MACT standards, but that the EPA's low-risk exemption program in PCWP Rule effectively gave the
Agency an equivalent power).
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In its PCWP rule, the EPA contended that it has the authority to
exempt a subcategory of "low-risk" sources releasing carcinogenic
chemicals because it assumed that Congress had made a drafting
error in subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) by using only the term "category," but not the term "subcategory."23 In rare cases where statutory language makes little sense or contravenes Congress's likely
intent, courts have recognized the doctrine of scrivener's error to
correct obvious errors in a statute. Because of a strong presumption that Congress normally is careful in using statutory language,
there is a heavy burden on an agency to demonstrate that a statute
contains a scrivener's error, and courts limit an agency's discretion
in rectifying such an error to the smallest change necessary to fix
the error.
On September 28, 2004, the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) and the Environmental Integrity Project filed a petition
for reconsideration (the Petition) with the EPA's then-Administrator, Michael Leavitt, asking him to indefinitely stay the PCWP
rule. 24 The Petition argues that the plain language of subsection
112(c)(9)(B)(i) explicitly allows the EPA to delist only an entire
source category of carcinogenic air toxics and only if every single
source in the category is low-risk. 25 Accordingly, the Petition contends that the Agency may not delete a limited subcategory of
sources emitting carcinogens, such as some but not all PCWP
sources. 26
This article concludes that the EPA's creation of a low-risk subcategory of PCWP sources is improper because the plain language
of subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) limits the Agency's delisting authority
to whole categories of carcinogenic sources. The EPA has failed to
meet its heavy burden in attempting to demonstrate that Congress
23 See PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,990 (discussing 42 U.S.c. § 7412(c)(9)(B)(i) and
concluding that absence of the term "subcategory" in that provision is a drafting error).
24 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22; Tom Hamburger & Alan C.
Miller, The Nation; Groups Appeal Rule on Plant Emissions, Los ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 29
2004, at A14. See also Petition for Review, Natural Resources Defense Council & Sierra
Club v. EPA, U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 04-1323 (Sept. 28, 2004),
available at http://www.4cleanair.org/members/committee/airtoxics/petitionforreview.pdf
(last visited Dec. 4, 2005); Press Release, Earthjustice, EPA Sued over Inadequate Plywood Air Pollution Rule (Sept 28, 2004), http://www.earthjustice.orglnews/display.htmI?lD
==909 (announcing suit by NRDC and Sierra Club against the EPA over Plywood Rule)
(last visited Dec. 4, 2005); Petition for Review, Environmental Integrity Project v. EPA,
U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 04-1323 (Sept. 28, 2004), available at
http://www.4cleanair.org/members/committee/airtoxics/PetitionforReviewofEIP.pdf (last
visited Dec. 4, 2005).
25 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22.
26 Id.

82

Virginia Environmental Law Journal

[Vol. 24:75

made a drafting error when it omitted the term "subcategory" in
subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) for carcinogenic chemicals. The doctrine of scrivener's error is inapplicable to the plain language of
subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i). There are plausible reasons why Congress would have used the term "subcategory" in subsection
112(c)(9)(B)(ii) for non-carcinogenic chemicals that were assumed
to have a safe threshold but deliberately omitted the term "subcategory" in subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) for carcinogenic chemicals
that were assumed in 1990 to have no safe threshold other than
zero emissions. 27
Part II examines the differences between "non-threshold" carcinogens and "threshold" non-carcinogens and the difficulties that
the EPA had in regulating air toxics under the 1970 Amendments
to section 112. Part III explains the 1990 Amendments to section
112, which shifted the statute to a largely technology-based focus.
Part IV examines two provisions in Section 112-subsections
112(d)(4) and 112(c)(9)(B)-that treat non-threshold carcinogens
differently than threshold non-carcinogens. Part V introduces the
PCWP Rule's process for delisting a "low-risk" subcategory of carcinogenic sources under subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i). Finally, Part
VI examines the EPA's argument that the omission of the term
"subcategories" in subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) is a drafting error. It
concludes that the EPA has failed to meet its burden of proving a
scrivener's error because there are plausible reasons why Congress
might have allowed the delisting of subcategories of non-carcinogenic sources, but limited the delisting of carcinogens to entire
source categories.
II.
A.

CARCINOGENS AND NON-CARCINOGENS: THE EARLY
HISTORY OF SECTION 112

What Are Air Toxics?

There are two main types of air toxics: carcinogens that cause
various types of cancer and non-carcinogens that cause other serious neurological, reproductive or acute diseases. Carcinogenic air
toxies, including, among many others, benzene and vinyl chloride,
cause an estimated three thousand cases of fatal cancer each year. 28
27 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 44-51 (arguing that the
EPA's claim that absence of the term "subcategory" in 42 U.S.c. § 112(c)(9)(B)(i) is a
drafting error is wrong because there are plausible reasons why Congress chose to omit
that term).
28 See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(a)(11) (defining "carcinogenic effect" as "hav[ing] the meaning
provided by the Administrator under Guidelines for Carcinogenic Risk Assessment as of
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Non-carcinogenic air toxics include various metals, such as mercury, chromium and cadmium, which can cause reproductive
harms, birth defects or other developmental disorders, lung disease, neurological disorders, and other health problems. 29
Until the late 1990s, the EPA assumed that all carcinogens were
non-threshold chemicals posing a risk of injury to human health at
all concentrations and that there was no completely safe level other
than zero exposure?O By contrast, the EPA generally assumed that
most non-carcinogens were "threshold" chemicals having a safe
limit at low levels of exposure and posing a risk to human health

the date of enactment"); McCubbin, supra note 2, at 1-2 (discussing regulation of carcinogenic air toxics); Reitze & Lowell, supra note 7, at 235. Some carcinogens may also cause
other harmful health effects; for example, new research indicates that long-term exposure
to even low-levels of benzene may harm white blood cells and may require more stringent
benzene limits than the current one part per million standard used by the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration for occupational exposure. Bryn Nelson, Worker Safety
Study: Benzene Depletes White Blood Celis, NEWSDA Y, Dec. 3, 2004, at A56.
29 See TAKING TOXICS OUT, supra note 2, at 1-2; 136 CONGo REC. S16,895, S16,925
(1990) (discussing regulation of non-carcinogenic air toxies); McCubbin, supra note 2, at 12; Reitze & Lowell, supra note 7, at 235.
30 See, e.g., Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,960,
17,968 (April 23, 1996) (stating the EPA generally assumes that if a substance causes cancer at any level of exposure that it will do so at every amount except zero exposure, unless
strong evidence demonstrates that there is a safe threshold); Guidelines for Carcinogen
Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,997 (Sept. 24, 1986) [hereinafter 1986 Guidelines]; National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Policy and Procedures
for Identifying, Assessing, and Regulating Airborne Substances Posing a Risk of Cancer,
44 Fed. Reg. 58,642, 58,659-60 (October 10, 1979) [hereinafter Policy and Procedures] {stat:
ing "[t]he method used to establish a margin of safety for a threshold pollutant-setting
the standard somewhere below the demonstrated effects level at a point at which the
absence of adverse health effects is predicted-therefore cannot be used to set standards
(other than at zero) for carcinogens under section 112, since risk of cancer is believed to
exist at any exposure level greater than zero"); Adam Babich, Too Much Science in Environmental Law, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 119, 158 (2003) (stating that regulators since 1958
have usually assumed that carcinogens have no safe threshold level, that the EPA officially
adopted this position in 1986, but that the Agency will consider evidence that a carcinogen
has a health threshold); Leslie F. Chard III, Comment, The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments: Section 112 Comes of Age, 59 U. CrN. L. REv. 1253, 1253 (1991) (stating assumption
of scientists and the EPA that carcinogens have no safe threshold); John P. Dwyer, The
Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 240 (1990) (defining non-threshold pollutant); Lisa Heinzerling, The Clean Air Act and the Constitution, 20 ST. Lours U.
PUB. L. REV. 121, 125-26 (2001) (explaining that science cannot determine whether nonthreshold pollutants will cause cancer risks at very low doses); William A. Wichers et aI.,
Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants Under the New Clean Air Act: Technology-Based
Standards at Last, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,717, 10,718 (1992). The EPA
weighs the strength of the science regarding whether a chemical is a human carcinogen, a
probable human carcinogen, or merely a possible human carcinogen. 1986 Guidelines,
supra, at 34,000; Babich, supra, at 157.
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only above a threshold concentration?1 In the 1990 Amendments
to the Act, Congress, in subsection 112(a)(11), expressly relied on
the definition of carcinogenic effect in the EPA's 1986 Guidelines
for Carcinogenic Risk Assessment, which presumes that all carcinogens are non-threshold chemicals?2 As discussed in Part IV, Congress in subsections 112(d)(4) and 112(c)(9)(B)(ii) appears to have
assumed that non-carcinogens alone have a threshold level. More
recently, beginning in approximately 1998, some evidence suggests
that only carcinogens that harm DNA have no safe threshold and
that other carcinogens that harm cellular structure, but not DNA,
may have a safe threshold?3 Congress has not amended section
112(a)(11) to reflect the possibility that some carcinogens have a
threshold. 34
31 See, e.g., Policy and Procedures, supra note 30, at 58,659-60; Babich, supra note 30, at
157 ("For non-cancer effects, regulators' working assumption is that there is a threshold
below which exposures are completely safe, and that the government can eliminate risk by
reducing exposures below observed 'no effect' levels."); Cary Coglianese & Gary E.
Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 1255, 1285 (2004) (stating that "a 'threshold pollutant' causes adverse effects only
above a certain exposure level, designated as the threshold level. In contrast, a 'nonthreshold' pollutant is one that may cause adverse effects at any level above zero exposure); William K. Reilly, Foreword to ROBERT D. FRIEDMAN, SENSITIVE POPULATIONS
AND ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS, at vii (1981) ("The Clean Air Act incorporates the
notion of threshold values of pollutants, levels below which there are presumed to be no
adverse health effects, and requires that standards be set on the basis of the threshold, with
a margin of safety.").
32 See 42 V.S.c. § 7412(a)(11) (defining "carcinogenic effect" as "hav[ing] the meaning
provided by the Administrator under Guidelines for Carcinogenic Risk Assessment [1986
Guidelines, supra note 30] as of the date of enactment.").
33 Recently, scientists have discovered and the EPA has recognized that some carcinogens may have a "safe" threshold level if they act through "cytotoxicity" (i.e., by damaging
cells) which can be reversed by regenerative cell proliferation, rather than harming nonreparable DNA. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations: Disinfectants and
Disinfection Byproducts, 63 Fed. Reg. 69,390, 69,401 (Dec. 16, 1998) (stating that the EPA
may find carcinogen has safe threshold level if sufficient scientific evidence exists); Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (discussing the EPA's
findings that chloroform, a carcinogen, has a safe threshold, because it has a cytotoxic
mechanism that harms cells, which are capable of regeneration, rather than harming DNA,
which cannot repair itself). Some scholars observe, however, that there is still a great deal
of scientific uncertainty in setting a threshold for a carcinogen. See Wendy E. Wagner, The
"Bad Science" Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate Over Science in Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 111 (2003) ("While mechanistic studies
and epidemiological research can sometimes support a 'best' scientific guess that there is,
in fact, a threshold below which a particular carcinogen is safe, this research generally
remains inconclusive. Thus, there is little scientific guidance for determining the point at
which existing research satisfactorily demonstrates that there is a safe dose for a given
toxin, or determining what that safe dose might be.").
34 See 42 V.S.c. § 7412(a)(11).
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In several areas, section 112 distinguishes between non-carcinogenic or "threshold" chemicals that are presumed to have a "safe"
threshold below a certain concentration and "non-threshold"35
chemicals or carcinogens that are presumed to cause cancer at
every dose level except zero. As is discussed in Part IV.A, section
112(d)(4) distinguishes between threshold and non-threshold
chemicals instead of distinguishing between carcinogens and noncarcinogens. 36 By contrast, as is discussed in Part IV.B below, sections 112(c)(9)(B)(i) and 112(c)(9)(B)(ii) distinguish carcinogens
from non-carcinogens.3 7
B.

1970-90: The EPA Struggles to Apply the "Ample Margin of
Safety" Standard

Section 112 of the 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act38
requires the EPA to establish health-based39 national emission
standards for hazardous air pollutants (NESHAPs) that provide an
"ample margin of safety" for human health.40 During the 1970s
and 1980s, the EPA focused its section 112 regulatory efforts primarily on non-threshold carcinogens that posed the greatest dangers to the public, at least based on the scientific knowledge of that
time. 41 Because Congress in the 1970 Amendments had given little
35 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc)
(defining a "non-threshold" pollutant as one that "appears to create a risk to health at all
non-zero levels of emission"); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants;
Proposed Standard for Vinyl Chloride, 40 Fed. Reg. 59,532, 59,533-34 (Dec. 24, 1975)
[hereinafter Proposed 1975 Standard for Vinyl Chloride] ("The term 'non-threshold pollutant' refers to a substance which creates a risk of adverse health effects at all ambient levels
(other than zero)."). One can never prove without question that a chemical has no threshold because it is "impossible to scientifically prove the absence of a threshold, as one can
never prove a negative." Coglianese & Marchant, supra note 31, at 1285 (quoting David L.
Eaton & Curtis D. Klaassen, Principles of Toxicology, in Casarett and Doull's TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS 11,21 (Curtis D. Klaassen ed., 6th ed. 2001».
36 42 V.S.c. § 7412(d)(4) (stating that "[w]ith respect to pollutants for which a health
threshold has been established, the Administrator may consider such threshold level, with
an ample margin of safety, when establishing emission standards under this subsection.").
37 See 42 V.S.c. §§ 7412(c)(9)(B)(i)-(ii).
38 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1685 (codified
as amended at 42 V.S.c. § 7412).
39 Some commentators and courts would describe these standards as "risk-based." See
supra note 6.
40 42 V.S.c. § 7412(b)(1)(B); Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 979 (D.C. Cir. 2004);
Dwyer, supra note 30, at 237-38; Mank, supra note 7, at 267-68; McCubbin, supra note 2,
at 3-4, 6-7; Reitze & Lowell, supra note 7, at 237.
41 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc)
("With the exception of mercury, every pollutant the Administrator has listed or intends to
list under § 112 is a non-threshold carcinogen."); Bernard D. Goldstein & Russellyn S.
Carruth, Science in the Regulatory Process: Implications of the Precautionary Principle for
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or no thought to the issue of non-threshold chemicals,42 section 112
provided little guidance on how the EPA should apply the "ample
margin of safety" standard, especially to non-threshold chemicals. 43
Because the EPA assumed that all carcinogens are non-threshold
chemicals that pose some danger to the public health at every level
of exposure except zero emissions,44 the agency faced the difficult
question of whether section 112's "ample margin of safety" standard required the EPA to ban all carcinogens. 45 Because the cost
of closing the numerous industries that rely on carcinogens likely
outweighed the health benefits of banning all carcinogenic air toxics, the EPA during the 1970s and 1980s interpreted section 112 to
authorize it to at least implicitly consider the costs and technological feasibility of regulation. 46 . Because section 112's statutory language and legislative history did not clearly address how the EPA
should balance health, cost and feasibility issues, the EPA often
deliberately delayed issuing section 112 standards for air toxics for
fear of judicial reversal. 47 The EPA only regulated seven air toxics
between 1970 and 1990-asbestos, beryllium, mercury,
radionuclides, inorganic arsenic, benzene, and vinyl chloride-and
Environmental Regulation in the United States: Examples from the Control of Hazardous
Air Pollutants in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, 66 LAW & CONfEMP. PROB. 247,
250-51 (2003) (stating that before 1990 Amendments, the EPA focused on regulating carcinogenic hazardous air pollutants).
42 See McCubbin, supra note 2, at 6-12.
43 See 3 GERRARD, supra note 8, at § 17.06[1][a][i]("Depending on one's interests and
point of view, one could interpret [Section 112's] language differently. Those concerned
about safety and the environment argued that an 'ample margin of safety' would often
require zero emissions for those non-threshold pollutants that have some possibility of an
adverse health impact at any exposure level above zero, while those in industry asserted
that technological and economic feasibility factors should be considered."); McCubbin,
supra note 2, at 6-12 (discussing the difficulties faced by the EPA during the 1970s and
1980s in interpreting section 112); Goldberg, supra note 6, at 622.
44 See Dwyer, supra note 30, at 254-55; McCubbin, supra note 2, at 6-12.
45 See Proposed 1975 Standard for Vinyl Chloride, 40 Fed. Reg. 59,532, 59,534 (Dec. 24,
1975) (stating that section 112 might require a complete ban on emissions of non-threshold
pollutants as that would be "the only emissions standard which would offer absolute safety
from ambient exposure"); Chard, supra note 30, at 1253, 1255-56 (discussing the EPA's
concern from 1970 until 1990 that section 112 might require a complete banning of all nonthreshold carcinogens); Dwyer, supra note 30, at 254-55; McCubbin, supra note 2, at 6-12.
46 If the Agency banned all carcinogens to eliminate all possible risks, it would have to
shut down most of the chemical industry as well as all coal-burning power plants, nuclear
power plants, and petroleum refineries. See Mank, supra note 7, at 268; McCubbin, supra
note 2, at 8-9; Chard, supra note 30, at 1255-56.
47 See Dwyer, supra note 30, at 234-35 (arguing that during 1970s and 1980s, the EPA
delayed implementing Section 112 because it believed statutory scheme was unworkable
and because it feared judicial reversal); Mank, supra note 7, at 264, 267-70; McCubbin,
supra note 2, at 6-10; Reitze & Lowell, supra note 7, at 238, 241-42.
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the agency issued five of these regulations because of court
orders. 48
Despite the uncertainty regarding whether section 112 authorizes the EPA to consider the cost and technological feasibility of
regulating air toxics, during the 1970s and 1980s the EPA increasingly began to consider such factors.49 Notably, between 1975 and
1985, the EPA considered cost and technological feasibility when it
proposed and revised regulations for vinyl chloride. 50 Vinyl chloride, a gaseous chemical used to produce polyvinyl chloride plastics, is a carcinogen known at high doses to cause liver cancer in
human beingsY In 1987, in a unanimous en banc decision written
by Judge Bork, the D.C. Circuit held in Natural Resources Defense
Council (NRDC) v. EPA (Vinyl Chloride)52 that section 112 did not
authorize the EPA to make cost and technological feasibility the
predominant considerations in setting emission standards for air
toxics because health was clearly the primary factor in section 112's
48 See 1990 House Report, supra note 9, at 3175 ("In the 20 years since this section was
enacted, the EPA has acted to establish standards under section 112 for seven hazardous
air pollutants. This is only a small fraction of the many substances associated (at some level
of concentration) with cancer, birth defects, neurological damage, or other serious health
impacts."); Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 979 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Dwyer, supra note 30, at
234--35; Mank, supra note 7, at 264, 267-70; McCubbin, supra note 2, at 6-10; Reitze &
Lowell, supra note 7, at 238, 241-42. The EPA listed or issued notices and health effects
information on twenty-five other air toxins, but it never issued regulations regarding them.
Reitze & Lowell, supra note 7, at 238.
49 See Dwyer, supra note 30, at 252-57 (discussing the EPA's increasing reliance during
1970s and 1980s on cost and technological factors when regulating air toxics under section
112); John D. Graham, The Failure of Agency-Forcing: The Regulation of Airborne Carcinogens Under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 35 DUKE L.J. 100, 131 (1985); Mank, supra
note 7, at 269-70; McCubbin, supra note 2, at 8-10; Wichers et aI., supra note 30, at 10,719;
Chard, supra note 30, at 1255-56.
50 See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Vinyl Chloride, 50
Fed. Reg. 1182, 1184 (Jan. 9, 1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61) (explaining the
Agency's decision to withdraw 1977 proposal because of cost and technological concerns);
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Standard for Vinyl Chloride,
41 Fed. Reg. 46,560, 46,564-69 (Oct. 21, 1976) [hereinafter 1976 Standard for Vinyl Chloride] (discussing costs and technological feasibility of regulating vinyl chloride); Proposed
1975 Standard for Vinyl Chloride, supra note 43, 40 Fed. Reg. at 59,533-34 (stating difficulties of implementing section 112 without considering cost and technological feasibility);
Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, (Vinyl Chloride) 824 F.2d 1146, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (en banc) (discussing the EPA's consideration of cost and technical feasibility in 1976
and 1985 regulations for vinyl chloride); Dwyer, supra note 30, at 235, 251-57 (discussing
the EPA's consideration of cost and technical feasibility in regulating vinyl chloride);
Mank, supra note 7, at 269-70; McCubbin, supra note 2, at 8.
51 There is strong evidence that vinyl chloride causes liver cancer in human beings and
some evidence that it causes cancer in the brain and the lungs. 1976 Standard for Vinyl
Chloride, supra note 50, at 46,559-60; Reitze & Lowell, supra note 7, at 242.
52 Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (Vinyl Chloride), 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en
banc).
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"ample margin of safety" standard. 53 However, the court rejected
the NRDC's two related contentions that section 112 requires the
EPA to (1) focus on only health considerations when establishing
emission standards for air toxics, and (2) adopt zero emission standards for any non-threshold carcinogens. 54 Instead, the court concluded that the statute's "ample margin of safety" language
requires the EPA to prevent only significant or "unacceptable"
risks, rather than any risk at all, because life in an industrialized
society inevitably exposes persons to som~ risk. 55 The court held
that section 112 requires the EPA to use a two-part process. First,
the agency must determine at what level of concentration a chemical poses an "acceptable risk to health."56 This obligates the EPA
to avoid significant or unacceptable risks to human health. Second,
the agency can consider technological or cost factors in assessing
what constitutes an "ample margin" of public safety.57 The Vinyl
Chloride decision is still important today because it is the only
major case to analyze section 112's ample margin of safety standard. The 1990 Amendments still define "an ample margin of
safety" in light of the statute's pre-1990 history. 58
53 Although acknowledging that the Agency's interpretation of section 112 deserves
considerable deference because of its expertise in regulating air toxics, the court concluded
that the EPA's interpretation of and implementation of section 112 was flawed because the
EPA administrator had not "exercised his expertise to determine an acceptable risk to
health," but had inappropriately "substituted technological feasibility for health as the primary consideration under Section 112." [d. at 1163-66 (rejecting the EPA's primary
emphasis on technology standards in regulating air toxies); Dwyer, supra note 30, at
270-271 (discussing Vinyl Chloride court's rejection of the EPA's primary emphasis on
technology standards in regulating air toxics); Mank, supra note 7, at 270; Reitze & Lowell,
supra note 7, at 243.
54 Vinyl Chloride. 824 F.2d at 1152, 1154-63 (describing NRDC's zero-risk interpretation of section 112 and rejecting it); Dwyer. supra note 30, at 270; Reitze & Lowell, supra
note 7, at 243; see also Mank, supra note 7, at 270.
55 Vinyl Chloride, 824 F.2d at 1164-65; Dwyer, supra note 30, at 270 (discussing Vinyl
Chloride court's conclusion that section 112 prohibits only significant risks); Mank, supra
note 7, at 270; Reitze & Lowell, supra note 7, at 243.
56 The court acknowledged that the EPA had significant latitude in defining "what is
'safe' or what constitutes an 'ample margin.' [The court held] only that the Administrator
cannot consider cost and technological feasibility in determining what is 'safe.' This determination must be based solely upon the risk to health." Vinyl Chloride, 824 F.2d at 1166.
57 [d. at 1154-65 (requiring the EPA to follow two-part test for regulating air toxics
under section 112); Dwyer, supra note 30, at 271 (discussing Vinyl Chloride court's twopart test for regulating air toxies under section 112); Mank, supra note 7, at 270; Reitze &
Lowell, supra note 7, at 243.
58 42 U.S.c. § 7412(f)(2)(A); 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR
AND WATER § 3.IE(A) & (B) (1986 & Supp. 2004) (stating 1990 Amendments to Act
define "residual risk" in light of pre-1990 "ample margin of safety" standard).

2005] Authority to Delist "Low-Risk" Sources of Carcinogens 89
III.

THE 1990 AMENDMENTS: TECHNOLOGY FIRST,
THEN RISK-BASED

Since the EPA had regulated only seven air toxics between 1970
and 1990, there was strong support for amending section 112 when
Congress sought to update and refine the Act in 1989 and 1990.
The EPA supported amendments to section 112 because the
Agency was unenthusiastic about implementing the Vinyl Chloride
decision's complex, two-part approach of determining "acceptable"
safety based solely on health factors and then considering cost and
technological feasibility in assessing an "ample margin of safety."59
During the deliberations on the 1990 Amendments to the Act, the
Senate Committee on the Environment blamed section 112's use of
health-based ample margin of safety standards as the reason for
the EPA's record of only regulating seven air toxics. The Committee's report stated:
The law has worked poorly. In 18 years, the EPA has regulated
only some sources of only seven chemicals. One reason the law has
worked poorly is the standard of protection required. "An ample
margin of safety" has been interpreted by many to mean zero
exposure to carcinogens, because any amount of exposure may
cause a cancer. The EPA has not been willing to write standards so
stringent because they would shutdown major segments of American industry. The legislation reported by the Committee would
entirely restructure the existing law, so that toxics might be adequately regulated by the Federal Government. 60
To avoid the problems with the pre-1990 version of section 112,
Congress in the 1990 Amendments to the Act shifted to a twophased approach that generally requires the EPA to first establish
technology-based standards and then only later address the
remaining residual risks from sources of air toxics. In Sierra Club
v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit summarized the 1990 Amendments' twophase process for regulating hazardous air pollutants (HAPs):
Congress established a two-phase approach for setting HAP
emission standards under the 1990 Amendments. . .. Dur59 See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Emissions
from Maleic Anhydride Plants, Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, Benzene Storage Vessels,
Benzene Equipment Leaks, and Coke By-Product Recovery Plants, 53 Fed. Reg. 28,496,
28,512 (July 28, 1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61) (criticizing acceptable risk standard for excluding benefits and technological feasibility); Dwyer, supra note 30, at 273-74
(discussing the EPA's view that Vinyl Chloride decision's two-part test would be very difficult for the Agency to apply).
60 1989 Senate Report, supra note 9, at 8469.
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ing the first phase, EPA must promulgate technology-based
emission standards for categories of sources that emit
HAPs. These emission standards are to be based not on an
assessment of the risks posed by HAPs, but instead on the
maximum achievable control technology (MAcr) for
sources in each category. ("The MACT standards are based
on the performance of technology, and not on the health
and environmental effects of hazardous air pollutants.").
The standards, at a minimum, must reflect the emissions limitation achieved by the best-performing sources in a particular category . . . . The idea is to set limits that, as an initial
matter, require all sources in a category to at least clean up
their emissions to the level that their best performing peers
have shown can be achieved.
The second phase then returns to a risk-based analysis. That
phase-which occurs within eight years after MACT standards are promulgated-requires EPA to consider whether
residual risks remain that warrant more stringent standards
than achieved through MAcr. EPA must determine
~hether such standards are required "in order to provide an
ample margin of safety to protect public health ... or to
prevent . . . an adverse environmental effect." ("[The
Amendments] require[ ] [EPA] to protect against all significant environmental effects when setting residual risk standards in the second phase.,,).61

A.

Technology-Based Standards: MACT and GACT

The 1990 amendments to subsection 112(d) generally require the
EPA to begin first with technology-based emission standards. 62 For
either new or existing "major"63 stationary sources of air toxics,
subsection 112(d) requires the EPA to establish emissions standards based on MACT, which are standards "based on the performance of technology, and not on the health and environmental
effects of hazardous air pollutants."64 Subsection 112(d) requires
Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (internal citations omitted).
42 V.S.c. § 7412(d)(2).
63 A "major" source is defined as "any stationary source or group of stationary sources
located within a contiguous area and under common control that emits or has the potential
to emit considering controls, in the aggregate, 10 tons per year or more of any hazardous
air pollutant or 25 tons per year or more of any combination of hazardous air pollutants."
42 V.S.c. § 7412(a)(I).
64 1989 Senate Report, supra note 9, at 8488; Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 980
(D.C. Cir. 2004) ("These emission standards are to be based not on an assessment of the
risks posed by HAPs, but instead on the maximum achievable control technology (MAeI')
for sources in each category.") (citing 1989 Senate Report, supra note 9).
61

62
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the Administrator to issue regulations that establish technologybased emission standards for each category or subcategory65 of
major and area sources of hazardous air pollutants that have been
listed for regulation under subsection 112( c).66 In issuing subsection 112(d) standards, the Administrator may distinguish among
classes, types, and sizes of sources within a category or subcategory.67 Under subsection 112(d), the EPA must establish technology-based standards for both sources of either carcinogenic or noncarcinogenic air toxics, although, as Part IV discusses, there are different exceptions to MACT standards depending on whether an air
toxie is carcinogenic or non-carcinogenie. 68
Pursuant to subsection 112(d)(2), the Administrator must set
MACT technology-based emission standards to achieve the "maximum" degree of emission reductions that are achievable for
sources in the category or subcategory. However, the Agency may
also consider the cost of achieving such emission reductions, especially for existing sources. 69 For new sources in a category or subcategory, the EPA must set MACT emission standards to be no less
stringent than the emission control that is achieved in practice by
the best-controlled similar source. 70 Although MACT is a stringent
standard that requires each source category to make substantial
reductions in their emissions from uncontrolled levels, the legislative history of the 1990 Amendments indicates that Congress in
1990 did not intend MACT emission standards to cost so much that
numerous sources or industries must shut down.71
The process for setting technology-based standards for existing
sources of air toxies consists of two steps. First, the EPA finds the
minimum MACT "floor" by examining the performance of the best
performing sources in a category. Second, the EPA sets even more
stringent standards if they are achievable in light of costs and other
factors:
65 The EPA maintains a current list of all categories and subcategories of MACf sources
in 40 c.F.R. § 63.1(a)(6). See also Agency's Unified Air Toxics Website: Source Category
List and Promulgation Schedule (Mar. 30, 2005), http://www.epa.gov/un/atw/socatisU
socatpg.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2005); 3 GERRARD, supra note 8, at § 17.06[3][ a] (discussing how Section 112 and the EPA define term "source category" of air toxics).
66 42 U.S.c. §§ 7412(d)(1)-(2).
67 42 U.S.c. §§ 7412(d)(1).
68 [d.
69 The House Report states that "consideration of cost should be based on an evaluation
of the cost of various control options." 1990 House Report, supra note 9, at 3352; FRANK
P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.03[15][c] n.27 (2004).
70 1990 House Report, supra note 9, at 3352; GRAD, supra note 69, at § 2.03[15][c] n.29.
71 1990 House Report, supra note 9, at 3352; GRAD, supra note 69, at § 2.03[15][c] n.27.
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Step one requires EPA to establish what has come to be
known as the MACT floor-the minimum level of reduction
required by statute. For existing sources, EPA sets the
MACT floor at "the average emission limitation achieved by
the best performing 5 sources" in a category "with fewer
than 30 sources." Once EPA has set the MACT floor, it may
then impose stricter standards-so-called "beyond-thefloor" limits-if the Administrator determines them to be
achievable after "taking into consideration the cost ... and
any non-air quality health and environmental impacts and
energy requirements." ... These "beyond-the-floor" limits
in phase one under Section 7412(d)(2) are distinct from the
risk-based limits to be set eight years later under Section
7412(f)(2) during phase twO.72
For existing sources that are part of categories or subcategories
with thirty or more sources, subsection 112(d)(3)(A) requires the
EPA to set a MACT floor standard that is at least as stringent as
the average emission limitation achieved by the best performing
twelve percent of the existing sources in the category or subcategory.73 For categories and subcategories of existing sources with
fewer than thirty sources, subsection 112(d)(3)(B) requires the
EPA to promulgate a MACT floor emission standard that is at least
as stringent as the average emission limitation achieved by the best
performing five sources for the category or subcategory.74 Pursuant to subsection 112(d)(7), however, any source subject to a more
stringent emission limitation or requirement under other provisions of the Clean Air Act or a state authority may not substitute a
MACT standard that would be less stringent. 75 Additionally, at
least every eight years, the Administrator must review and revise
as necessary the MACT emissions standards promulgated under
subsection 112(d).76

Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
The statute excludes from this calculation any sources that have achieved the stringent Lowest Achievable Emission Rate (LAER). This applies to major new or modified
sources of criteria pollutants in non-attainment areas, within eighteen months before the
Agency proposes a MACf emission standard or within thirty months before the Agency
adopts a MACT standard. 42 U.S.c. § 7412(d)(3). The Lowest Achievable Emission Rate
(LAER), which applies to major new or modified sources of criteria pollutants in nonattainment areas, is defined in section 171 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.c. § 7501(3)(A).
74 See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(d)(3)(B); 1990 House Report, supra note 9, at 3352-53.
75 42 U.S.c. § 7412(d)(7); GRAD, supra note 69, at § 2.03[15][c]; Garrett & Winner,
supra note 12, at 10,248.
76 42 U.S.c. § 7412(d)(6); GRAD, supra note 69, at § 2.03[15][c].
72
73
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Not all sources of air toxics require MACT. For smaller "area"
sources of air toxics, which are not major sources because they
emit less than twenty-five tons of air toxics per year and also less
than ten tons per year of any single air toxic,77 the Administrator
may promulgate emissions standards based on generally available
control technologies (GACT) or management practices. 78 Emissions standards based on GACT may be less stringent than those
for major new or existing sources governed by MACT. 79 Unlike
MACT standards, the EPA has more discretion in setting GACT
standards because the Agency does not have to use the best
existing sources to define a floor or minimum level of stringency
for GACT.80 As discussed below in Part VI.CA, the EPA enjoys
greater discretion in delisting area sources of carcinogens and noncarcinogens from GACT or otherwise applicable emission standards than it does in delisting major sources of carcinogens. 81
B.

Section 112(f)'s Residual Risk Program

Section 112(f) of the Act provides for a second phase of healthbased "residual risk" emission standards more stringent than
MACT if the technology-based standards for a source category or
subcategory fail to provide adequate protection to human health or
the environment. 82 Pursuant to Section 112(f)(2)(A), within eight
years after the Agency promulgates a MACT standard for a source
category or subcategory, the EPA is required to determine whether
remaining air toxic emissions from MACT-controlled sources in
the category or subcategory pose an unacceptable risk to human
health. 83 What is most important for the purposes of this article is
that the residual risk standards focus on carcinogens, and barely
mention threshold chemicals. The residual risk provisions are yet
another portion of section 112 that treats carcinogens differently
from non-carcinogens.
If, after the EPA has implemented MACT, any source in a
source category poses a cancer risk greater than one-in-one-million
42 U.S.c. § 7412(a)(2) (defining area source).
42 U.S.c. § 7412(d)(5).
79 [d.; GRAD, supra note 69, at § 2.03[15][c].
80 See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(5); David P. Novello, The Air Taxies Program at the Crossroads: From MACT to Residual Risk, 18 WTR NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 57, 60 (2004).
81 See infra notes 199-204 and accompanying text.
82 See 42 U.S.c. §7412(f).
83 See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(f)(2)(A); Mank, supra note 7, at 264-67, 275-77 (discussing section 112(f)'s residual risk program); McCubbin, supra note 2, at 2-6, 37-42, 47-49; Novello,
supra note 80, at 6l.
77
78
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to the maximally exposed individual, the EPA must promulgate
health-based "residual risk" emission standards to supplement the
technology-based standards that are adequate "to provide an
ample margin of safety to protect public health in accordance with
this section (as in effect before 1990) or to prevent, taking into consideration costs, energy, safety, and other relevant factors, an
adverse environmental effect."84 Subsection 112(f)(2)(A) explicitly states that the EPA should use the "ample margin of safety"
standard in effect before November 15, 1990 as the minimum standard for any residual risk emission standards. 85 Accordingly, the
D.C. Circuit's 1987 Vinyl Chloride decision is still relevant in defining the meaning of "ample margin of safety" for the public
health. 86
Subsection 112(f)(2)(A) contains a specific risk trigger for carcinogens that requires the EPA to promulgate health-based emission standards providing an "ample margin of safety" if the MACT
standards do not "reduce lifetime excess cancer risks to the individual most exposed to emissions from a source in the category or
subcategory to less than one-in-one-million."87 The statute's onein-one-million risk standard is a "trigger" requiring the EPA to
take further regulatory action. However, the EPA probably has
the discretion to use a less stringent risk standard for any residual
risk emission standards, perhaps even a standard of one-in-tenthousand lifetime cancer risk. 88 The conference report for the 1990
amendments refers to the Vinyl Chloride decision and the Agency's
1989 benzene rulemaking, which used a one-in-ten-thousand lifetime excess cancer risk as the maximum allowable risk,89 as models
for the EPA's creation of residual risk standards. 90 Subsection
112(f)(2)(B) states that the amended section 112 does not affect
See 42 u.s.c. § 7412(f)(2)(A).
[d.
86 Vinyl Chloride, 824 F.2d at 1146.
frI See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(f)(2); Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(discussing section 112(f)'s residual risk program); McCubbin, supra note 2, at 18-20,
25-26.
88 See McCubbin, supra note 2, at 18-20, 25-26, 37-38, 42, 46-49 (discussing section
112(f)'s residual risk program's one-in-one-million cancer risk as trigger for the EPA to
take regulatory action and the legislative history's discussion of benzene rule making's onein-ten-thousand standard as model for regulatory action).
89 National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Emissions from
Maleic Anhydride Plants, Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, Benzene Storage Vessels, Benzene
Equipment Leaks, and Coke By-Product Recovery Plants, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,044, 38,044-46
(Sept. 14, 1989) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61 subparts L, Y) [hereinafter 1989 Benzene
NESHAPj.
90 The Conference Report stated:
84
85
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the EPA's pre-November 15, 1990 interpretation of "this section"
that is "set forth in the Federal register of September 14, 1989 (54
Federal Register 38044)," which is the benzene rulemaking. 91 In
the 1989 Benzene NESHAP, the EPA did not use a one-in-onemillion standard to protect the individual most exposed to emissions, but rather used a presumption that a one-in-ten-thousand
lifetime excess cancer risk for the maximum individual lifetime
cancer risk (MIR) from a particular chemical was acceptable. 92
Furthermore, in the 1989 Benzene NESHAP, the EPA stated that
it would examine other health and risk factors besides the one-inten-thousand lifetime excess cancer risk to the maximally exposed
individual in deciding whether to adopt more stringent emission
requirements. 93 In 1989, the EPA required sources emitting
radionuc1ides to limit the risk to ninety percent of the people
within eighty kilometers of a source to a one-in-one million lifetime risk of cancer, and proposed a similar standard for some benzene sources. 94 Similarly, the EPA stated that its residual standards
In the first step of [its] analysis, the [EPA] Administrator must determine a safe or accept·
able level of risk considering only health factors. In the second step, the Administrator may
consider cost, feasibility or other relevant factors in addition to health in order to set a
standard to provide an "ample margin of safety." This approach is required under the
decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals in [Vinyl Chloride] (interpreting section 112 as in
effect prior to these Amendments), and is set forth in the rulemaking on emissions stan· .
dards for benzene, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,044 (Sept. 14, 1989).
Conference Report on S. 1630, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, S. REP. No. 101-952,
at 339 (1990) (Conf. Rep.); see 136 CONGo REC. SI6,895, S16,932 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Durenberger) (stating ample margin of safety at least as protective as
benzene regulations); 1989 Benzene NESHAP, supra note 89, at 38,044-38,046; Mank,
supra note 7, at 270-71, 276 (discussing section 112(f)'s residual risk program's one-in-onemillion cancer risk as trigger for the EPA to take regulatory action and the legislative
history's discussion of benzene rule making's one-in-ten-thousand standard as model for
regulatory action); McCubbin, supra note 2, at 18-20, 25-26, 37-38, 42, 46-49.
91 See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(f)(2)(B); Mank, supra note 7, at 276.
92 See 1989 Benzene NESHAP, supra note 89, at 38,044-38,046 (using a historical risk
survey to set a "presumptive level" of maximum acceptable individual risk at one-in-tenthousand); Dwyer, supra note 30, at 276 (discussing one-in-ten-thousand risk level); Mank,
supra note 7, at 270-71, 276; Reitze & Lowell, supra note 7, at 245.
93 These factors include: (1) the overall incidence of cancer or other serious health
effects within the exposed population, (2) the number of persons exposed within each individual lifetime range (such as a 50-kilometer exposure radius around the emitting facilities), (3) the science and policy assumptions and estimation uncertainties associated with
the risk measures, (4) the weight of the scientific evidence for human health effects, (5)
other quantified or unquantified health effects, and (6) the effects resulting from co-location of facilities and co-emission of pollutants. 1989 Benzene NESHAP, supra note 89, at
38,045-46; Mank, supra note 7, at 276 n.60.
94 See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Radionuclides, 54
Fed. Reg. 51,654, 51,655 (Dec. 15, 1989) (requiring radionuclide sources to limit risk to
ninety percent of population within eighty kilometers to one-in-one-million lifetime cancer
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will go beyond the one-in-ten-thousand standard where cost-effective technology is available and seek to protect "the greatest number of persons possible" under a one-in-one-million standard. 95
Section 112(f) does not explicitly address non-cancer risks.
However, the EPA probably has an implicit duty under the statute
to reduce residual risks from non-cancer causing chemicals that
pose serious risks. This implicit duty is based on section 112(f)(2)'s
general requirement that the EPA establish emission standards
that provide "an ample margin of safety" as defined by section 112
before 1990 and additional language that authorizes the Agency to
issue more stringent standards than those used before 1990 if they
are necessary "to prevent ... an adverse environmental effect. "96
Nevertheless, subsection 112(f)(2) is far less specific about noncancer risks than cancer risks and is an example of Congress regulating carcinogenic air toxics differently from non-carcinogenic
pollutants.
.
IV.

EXCEPTIONS TO MACT: THRESHOLD POLLUTANTS
AND DELISTING

During the debates on the 1990 Amendments, Senator
Durenberger (D-Minnesota) stated that the EPA may promulgate
residual risk standards under subsection 112(f) only if it seeks to
impose standards more stringent than MACT standards. 97 However, he also recognized that the E;PA could exempt low-risk
sources from MACT standards under' either subsection 112(d)( 4),
risk) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt 61); Mank, supra note 7, at 276 n.59; Reitze & Lowell,
supra note 7, at 245; see also National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants;
Benzene Emissions From Chemical Manufacturing Process Vents, Industrial Solvent Use,
Benzene Waste Operations, Benzene Transfer Operations, and Gasoline Marketing System, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,083,38,091 (Sept. 14, 1989) ("The majority of the people (greater than
99.9 %) exposed to benzene emissions from this category would be exposed to risk levels
lower than [one-in-one-millionJ.").
95 See OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARDS, U.S. EPA, RESIDUAL RISK
REPORT TO CONGRESS, EPA-4531R-99-001, at ES-l1 (1999), available at http://www.epa.
gov/ttn/oarpglt3/reports/risk_rep.pdf (stating goal of limiting excessive cancer risk where
cost effective to one-in-one-million for as many people as possible); McCubbin, supra note
2, at 42 n.174 (discussing the EPA's goal in 1999 Residual Risk Report of limiting excessive
cancer risk where cost effective to one-in-one-million for as many people as possible);
March Sadowitz & John Graham, A Survey of Residual Cancer Risks Permitted By Health,
Safety and Environmental Policy, 6 RISK 17, 26 (1995) (stating that the EPA in its residual
risk standards will adopt approach in 1989 radionuclides rule of limiting excess cancer risk
to one-in-ten-thousand to maximally exposed individuals and seek to limit risk to as many
persons as possible to one-in-one-million).
96 See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(f)(2); Mank, supra note 7, at 289-90 (observing that section
112(f)'s residual risk program is less specific about addressing risks of non-carcinogens).
97 136 CONGo REC. S16,895, S16,932 (1990) (remarks of Sen. Durenberger).
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which provides a narrow exception to MACT and residual risk
standards for sources releasing threshold air toxics, or subsection
112(c)(9)(B)'s delisting process, which is the only exemption that
can apply to carcinogens. 98
The Administrator is to replace the technology standards for
a source category, only if it is necessary to protect health
with a more stringent standard. This bill does not authorize
the Administrator to relax the standards established under
subsection (d) for a category by establishing standards under
subsection (f). With respect to the pollutants for which a
safe threshold can be set, the authority to set a standard less
stringent than maximum achievable control technology is
contained in subsection (d)(4). With respect to carcinogens
and other non-threshold pollutants, no such authority exists
in subsection (d) or in any other provision of the Act. There
is no safe level of exposure for these pollutants. And there
is no possibility under the two-step decisionmaking procedures established by the Court in the vinyl chloride case for
EPA to set a standard less stringent than is already being
achieved by sources in the category under subsection (d).
Any such interpretation is entirely inconsistent with the
ample margin of safety test which is a mandatory second
step in a standard-setting regime which most definitely
includes ~oth steps.99
No postponements or exceptions are available regarding
standards under subsection (f) for reasons of voluntary
reductions or for any other reason not expressly authorized
by the statute. Risk assessments may not be used to postpone, lessen the stringency of, or gain an exception from any
standard issued under subsection (d) (or any alternative
emission limit adopted pursuant to a voluntary reduction or
for any other reason), except as provided by subsection
112(c)(9)(B)(i).100

As is discussed below in Subparts A and B, section 112 provides
for alternative standards or delisting exceptions to MACT risk
standards under subsection 112(d)(4)'s "ample margin of safety"
standard for threshold pollutants and subsection 112(c)(9)(B)'s
delisting process for both carcinogens and non-carcinogens.

Id.
Id.
100 Id.

98

99

98
A.
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Section 112(d)(4): Threshold Pollutants May Use an "Ample
Margin of Safety" Standard Instead of MACT

"With respect to pollutants for which a health threshold has been
established," subsection 112(d)(4) states that the EPA "Administrator may consider such threshold level, with an ample margin of
safety, when establishing emission standards under this subsection."l01 For threshold chemicals, subsection 112(d)(4) implies that
the EPA may substitute either new or pre-1990 health-based emission standards providing an "ample margin of safety" to the public
health in lieu of MACT technology-based standards. 102 In a recent
article, Professor McGarity concludes that subsection 112( d)( 4)
likely allows the EPA to exempt threshold air toxics from MACT if
the Agency can establish an emissions standard that will provide an
ample margin of safety.103 That said, he acknowledges that the language of the statute is not conclusive. Citing subsection 112(d)(4),
he argues:
The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act require EPA to
establish NESHAPs for stationary sources reflecting the
maximum achievable control technology (MACT) for emitters of hazardous air pollutants, a standard which rather
clearly represents a best efforts goal. In the case of carcinogens, these standards must be met even if compliance
reduces the risks to exposed individuals to extremely low
levels. The statute allows the agency to consider established
health thresholds for pollutants for which such thresholds
have been established, along with an ample margin of safety.
This suggests-but only very vaguely-that Congress may
have adopted a mixed strategy with respect to sources that
emit threshold pollutants. Maximum achievable technology
may not be required if something less will ensure human
exposures below the threshold level plus an ample margin of
safety. 104

It is notable that Congress in the 1990 Amendments authorized
the EPA to use "ample margin of safety" emission standards for
101 42 U.S.c. § 7412(d)(4) ("[w]ith respect to pollutants for which a health threshold has
been established, the Administrator may consider such threshold level, with an ample margin of safety, when establishing emission standards under this subsection.").
102 See RODGERS, supra note 58, at § 3.1E(A) (stating 1990 Amendments to Act generally left the EPA with authority to use pre-1990 emission standards and "ample margin of
safety" standard in lieu of technology-based standards).
103 Thomas O. McGarity, The Goals of Environmental Legislation, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REv. 529 (2004).
104 Id. at 548--49 (citing subsection 112(d)(4)) (internal citations omitted).
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threshold pollutants, which in 1990 were generally assumed to
include only non-carcinogens. However, Congress did not give the
Agency similar discretion with respect to non-threshold pollutants,
which in 1990 were generally believed to include all carcinogens. lOS
The Senate Report addressing the 1990 Amendments provides
the most clear explanation for the EPA's authority to use a less
stringent health-based standard under Section 112(d)( 4) in lieu of
MACT standards. The Senate Report explains:
For some pollutants a MACT emissions limitation may be
far more stringent than is necessary to protect public health
and the environment. For some of the hazardous air pollutants listed under subsection (b) it is possible to establish a
"no observable effects level" (NOEL) below which human
exposure is presumably "safe" ... To avoid expenditures by
regulated entities which secure no public health or environmental benefit, the Administrator is given discretionary
authority to consider the evidence for a health threshold
higher than MACT ... The Administrator is not required to
take such factors into account; that would jeopardize the
standard-setting schedule imposed under this section with
the kind of lengthy study and debate that has crippled the
current program. But where health thresholds are wellestablished, for instance in the case of ammonia, and the
pollutant presents no risk of other adverse health effects,
including cancer, for which no threshold can be established,
the Administrator may use the threshold with an ample
margin of safety (and not considering cost) to set emissions
limitations for sources in the category or sUbcategory.
Employing a health threshold or safety level rather than the
MACT criteria to set standards shall not result in adverse
environmental effects which would otherwise be reduced or
eliminated. 106

105 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing 1990 assumption that all
carcinogens were non-threshold chemicals and only non-carcinogens generally possessed a
"safe" threshold).
106 S. REP. No. 228, at 171 (1989); 1 JOHN-MARK STENSVAAG & CRAIG N. OREN,
CLEAN AIR Acr: LAW AND PRACfICE § 11.12 (1991) (concluding that pursuant to subsection 112(d)(4), "[t]he 1990 amendments indicate that the EPA may sometimes establish
routine emission standards more lenient than the levels that would otherwise be achieved
by implementing MAcr."); Wichers et a!., supra note 30, at 10,722 ("The Senate Report
suggests that the relevant MAcr performance standard could be relaxed if the HAP has a
clearly defined threshold below which no adverse health effects are observed, and no
adverse environmental effects are otherwise increased or prolonged.") (citing S. REP. No.
228, supra, at 171).

100
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For the purposes of this article, it is significant that subsection
112(d)( 4) treats threshold non-carcinogens differently from nonthreshold carcinogens by providing a potential exemption from
MACT for threshold chemicals, but not for non-threshold
chemicals. 107

B.

The EPA's Authority to Delist Under Subsection 112(c)(9)(B)

1.

Statutory Language

In response to a petition by any person or the Administrator's
own motion, subsection 112(c)(9)(B) authorizes the Administrator
to delete a category or, sometimes, a subcategory of sources from
the list of categories subject to MACT emission standards if all
sources within the category or subcategory are below certain risk
levels. lOB The EPA must approve or deny a petition under sub sec107 The EPA has used subsection 112(d)(4) to exempt some sources of low·risk, thresh·
old chemicals. See, e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for
Industrial, Commercial, and Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters, 69 Fed. Reg. 55,218,
55,218,55,227-28 (Sept. 13,2004) (to be codified at 40 c.F.R. Part 63) (providing alternative health-based standard to MACT technology-based standards for two low-risk, threshold chemicals: (1) hydrogen chloride (HCl) and (2) manganese).
108 Section 112(c)(9)(B) states in full:
The Administrator may delete any source category from the list under this
subsection, on petition of any person or on the Administrator's own motion,
whenever the Administrator makes the following determination or determinations, as applicable:
(i) In the case of hazardous air pollutants emitted by sources in the category
that may result in cancer in humans, a determination that no source in the
category (or group of sources in the case of area sources) emits such hazardous air pollutants in quantities which may cause a lifetime risk of cancer
greater than one-in-one-million to the individual in the population who is
most exposed to emissions of such pollutants from the source (or group of
sources in the case of area sources).
(ii) In the case of hazardous air pollutants that may result in adverse health
effects in humans other than cancer or adverse environmental effects, a determination that emissions from no source in the category or subcategory concerned (or group of sources in the case of area sources) exceed a level which
is adequate to protect public health with an ample margin of safety and no
adverse environmental effect will result from emissions from any source (or
from a group of sources in the case of area sources).
The Administrator shall grant or deny a petition under this paragraph within
1 year after the petition is filed.
42 U.S.c. §§ 7412(c)(9)(B); see PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,983 (explaining the difference between the EPA's deletion of categories or subcategories from MACT rules under
subsection 112(c)(9) and Agency's authority to issue health-based standards providing an
ample margin of safety pursuant to subsection 112(d)(4»; 3 GERRARD, supra note 8, at
§ 17.06[3][c]; GRAD, supra note 69, at § 2.03[15][c]; Garrett & Winner, supra note 12, at
10,247; Wichers et aI., supra note 30, at 10,725.

2005] Authority to Delist "Low-Risk" Sources of Carcinogens 101
tion 112(c)(9)(B) within one year of its filing. 109 In reconciling subsection 112(c)(9)(B) with subsection 112(d)'s MACT standards,
Professor McGarity concludes that Congress adopted a "mixed
strategy" that is primarily based on technology standards, but that
also contains a "risk concession" for low-risk sources yo
Subsection 112(c)(9)(B) explicitly employs different approaches
for categories emitting carcinogens and categories releasing noncarcinogens. For source categories that emit carcinogens, subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) states that the Administrator may delete a
"category" if she "determin[es] that no source in the category (or
group of sources in the case of area sources) emits such hazardous
air pollutants in quantities which may cause a lifetime risk of cancer greater than one-in-one-million to the individual in the population who is most exposed to emissions of such pollutants from the
source (or group of sources in the case of area sources)."111 Subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) does not mention the term, "subcategory."112
Similarly, subsection 112(c)(9)(B) only explicitly refers to the deletion of an entire source category and does not mention the deletion
of subcategoriesY3 By contrast, subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(ii) states
that "[i]n the case of hazardous air pollutants that may result in
adverse health effects in humans other than cancer or adverse environmental effects," the Administrator may delete a "category or
subcategory" of sources if she determines that "emissions from no
source in the category or subcategory concerned (or group of
109 42 U.S.c. § 7412(c)(9)(B); 3 GERRARD, supra note 8, at § 17.06[3][c]; Wichers et aI.,
supra note 30, at 10,725.
110 Professor McGarity's full explanation states:
EPA may delete a category of sources of one or more hazardous pollutants
from the list of categories, and thereby avoid the maximum achievable control
. technology requirement for that category, if certain risk-based conditions are
met for all sources in the category. In the case of threshold pollutants, EPA
must find that emissions from no source in the category will exceed "a level
which is adequate to protect public health with an ample margin of safety and
no adverse environmental effect will result." In the case of non threshold pollutants, EPA must find that no source in the category emits hazardous pollutants "in quantities which may cause a lifetime risk of cancer greater than
one-in-one-million to the individual in the population who is most exposed to
emissions from the source." Thus, for such categories subject to deletion from
the list, Congress has articulated a mixed strategy that is technology-based
with a risk concession.
McGarity, supra note 103, at 549 (citing subsection 112(c)(9)(B)) (footnotes omitted).
111 See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(c)(9)(B)(i) (emphasis added); 3 GERRARD, supra note 8, at
§ 17.06[3][c]; GRAD, supra note 69, at § 2.03 n.22; Garrett & Winner, supra note 12, at
10,247; Wichers et aI., supra note 30, at 10,725.
112 42 U.S.c. § 7412(c)(9)(B)(i).
113 42 U.s.c. § 7412(c)(9)(B).
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sources in the case of area sources) exceed a level which is adequate to protect public health with an ample margin of safety and
no adverse environmental effect will result from emissions from
any source . . . ."114 Accordingly, subsection 112(c)(9)(B )(ii)
explicitly authorizes the EPA to delist either a source category or
subcategory of sources emitting non-carcinogens if the Agency
concludes that (1) it can set an emission standard providing an
ample margin of safety for human health from all sources in the
category or subcategory and (2) no source in the category or subcategory will pose an adverse effect on the environment if it is
exempted from MACT standards.
A crucial issue is whether subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) provides
the EPA with the authority to delist both subcategories and categories of sources emitting carcinogens or only entire categories of
sources. This question has important practical application because,
for instance, the EPA claims that approximately one-half of PCWP
sources are low-risk, but acknowledges that some pose a high risk
of cancerYs Subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) and (ii) are similar in that
both require that all the sources in a category (or a subcategory
under Subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(ii» that is being delis ted must meet
the applicable risk threshold if the Administrator is to exempt that
category or subcategoryY6 Accordingly, because all sources in
either a subcategory or category must be "low-risk" in order for
the EPA to delist that subcategory or category, the EPA can not
de list the entire PCWP category because some PCWP sources are
high-risk. Rather, the Agency can only delist a subcategory of
"low-risk" PCWP sources if Subsection 112(c)(9)(B )(i) authorizes
the EPA to delist a subcategory of carcinogenic sources. Parts V
and VI will address whether the EPA may place the low-risk
PCWP facilities in a separate subcategory and then delist them.

114 42 U.S.c. § 7412(c)(9)(B)(ii) (emphasis added); 3 GERRARD, supra note 8, at
§ 17.06[3][c]; GRAD, supra note 69, at § 2.03; Garrett & Winner, supra note 12, at 10,247;

Wichers et aI., supra note 30, at 10,725.
115 PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,956.
116 See PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,983 (explaining the difference between the
EPA's deletion of categories or subcategories from MACT rules under subsection
112(c)(9) and Agency's authority to issue health-based standards providing an ample margin of safety pursuant to subsection 112(d)(4».
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V. THE PCWP RULE: THE EPA's USE OF SUBSECfION
112(c)(9)(B) TO DELIST A SUBCATEGORY OF Low-RISK
CARCINOGENIC SOURCES FROM
MACT STANDARDS

A.

Summary of the PCWP Rule

The PCWP rule applies to approximately 223 facilities that manufacture plywood, veneer, particleboard, fiberboard or other composite wood productsY7 According to the EPA's calculations, the
PCWP rule will reduce emissions of several air toxics-acetaldehyde, acrolein, formaldehyde, methanol, phenol, propionaldehyde
and others-by at least 6,600 tons and as much as 11,000 tons per
year (approximately 35 to 58 percent lower than 1997 levels)Ys
The EPA estimated that the total annual costs for the PCWP industry to comply with the rule could be as high as $140 million per
year, but the Agency suggested that the deletion of about 147 "lowrisk" PCWP sources from MACT would reduce the annual cost to
about $74 millionY9 The total cost would vary in relationship to
the number of facilities qualifying under the subsection
112(c)(9)(B) deletion provisionpo
It will be helpful to review the Rule's process for delisting facilities. If an individual PCWP facility can demonstrate that it emits
relatively low amounts of carcinogens, especially acrolein or formaldehyde, which are the most important carcinogens typically
released by PCWP facilities, the EPA will use its alleged authority
under subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) to "delist" that facility from the
PCWP category's MACT standards and place it instead in a separate low-risk subcategory of PCWP sources that are not subject to
MACT.121 Each PCWP source has the burden of demonstrating
that it is low-risk. 122 To qualify for the subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i)
exempt subcategory, each PCWP source must submit a risk assessment showing that the source is low-risk as defined by the PCWP
rule. 123 A source can either use "look-up tables" in Appendix B of
subpart DDDD of the rule, or use data from site-specific modeling
to demonstrate that it is low-risk. The EPA stated:
117

PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,955.

[d.
[d.
120 [d.
121 [d. at 45,953-56, 45,983-91, 45,995-96, 45,998-99, 46,040-45; see also 42 U.S.c.
§ 7412(c)(9)(B)(i).
122 PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,953-56, 45,983-91, 45,995-96, 45,998-99, 46,040-45.
123 [d. at 45,946, 45,953-54, 45,991-46,007, 46,040-43.
118
119
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Today's final PCWP rule provides two ways that an affected
source may demonstrate that it is part of the low-risk subcategory of PCWP affected sources. First, look-up tables allow
affected sources to determine, using a limited number of
site-specific input parameters, whether emissions from their
sources might cause a hazard index (HI) limit for noncarcinogens or a cancer benchmark of one in a million to be
exceeded. Second, a site-specific modeling approach can be
used by those affected sources that cannot demonstrate that
they are part of the low-risk subcategory using the look-up
tables. 124
The EPA has estimated that approximately 147 of the 223 PCWP
sources in the PCWP MACT category may qualify for the subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) "low-risk" exceptionPS

B.

Public Comments on Delisting a Subcategory of Carcinogens

One commenter on the proposed PCWP rule argued that the
absence of the term "subcategories" in subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i)
implied that Congress intended to prohibit the Administrator from
delisting subcategories of sources emitting carcinogens under subsection 112(c)(9)(B).126 That commenter contended that the distinction between threshold and non-threshold sources is consistent
with 112(c)(9)(B)(i)'s requirement of a higher standard of proof to
delist categories that emit carcinogens. 127 They also asserted that
subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i)'s requirement that no source in a category pose greater than a one-in-one-million lifetime cancer risk for
the most exposed individual is "a higher and more specific standard" than the standard for deleting categories or subcategories of
non-carcinogenic air toxics under subsection 112(c)(9)(B )(ii),
which simply requires an "ample margin of safety. "128
Other commenters, however, argued that the EPA should construe the statute to allow it to delete categories or subcategories
under either subsections 112(c)(9)(B)(i) or (ii).129 They noted that
section 112(c)(1) generally gives the EPA broad authority in defining categories and subcategories of sources.130 One commenter
argued that Congress had used the terms category and subcategory
124

125
126
127
128
129

130

ld. at 45,984, 46,040-45.
ld. at 45,956.
ld. at 45,987.
ld.
ld.
[d.
ld.
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interchangeably throughout section 112, and therefore, that one
should interpret subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) as authorizing the EPA
to de list either a category and subcategory of sources.l3l
C.

1.

The EPA's Argument That the Agency Has Broad Discretion
to Define Categories or Subcategories Under Section 112
The Agency's Broad Discretion Argument

In the PCWP rule, the EPA argued that various provisions of
section 112 gave it broad discretion to define which sources comprise a category or subcategory, and therefore, to classify sources
as either a category or subcategoryY2 In particular, the EPA
relied on two provisions of section 112 that give the agency broad
discretionary authority: (1) subsection 112(d)(I), which authorizes
the EPA to distinguish among classes, types, and sizes of sources
within a category and (2) subsection 112(c)(I), which authorizes
the Agency to revise, "when appropriate," but at least every eight
years, its list of categories and subcategories of major sources and
area sources. Subsection 112(c)(I), however, encourages the
Agency "to the extent practicable" to make its section 112 list consistent with its "list of source categories published pursuant to section 111 of this Title."133
Some commenters to the draft PCWP Rule argued that either
subsection 112(c)(I) or 112(c)(9)(B) requires the EPA to base categories and subcategories on traditional criteria such as differences
in output, products, processes or technology, and that risk is not an
appropriate basis for distinguishing among categories or subcategoriesp4 In the final PCWP Rule, the EPA acknowledged that the
Agency's past practice was to base subcategories and categories on
engineering factors and not risk, stating: "We do not contend that
the CAA specifically directs us to establish categories and subcategories of HAP sources based on risk, and we recognize that, at the
time of the 1990 CAA Amendments, Congress may have assumed
that we would generally base categories and subcategories on the
traditional technological, process, output, and product factors that
had been considered under CAA section 111."135 The EPA
argued, however, that it was not bound by subsections 112(c)(I) or
112(c)(9) to use traditional categories and could base a subcategory
131

132

133
134
135

Id.
Id. at 45,946, 45,984-85, 45,986-91.
Id. at 45,984 (discussing 42 U.S.c. §§ 7412(c)(1), (d)(l».
See PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,987-90.
Id. at 45,989.
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on risk-based factorsP6 Although subsection 112(c)(1) states that
the EPA should try to make the section 112 list of source categories
and subcategories consistent with the section 111 list, section
112(c)(1) also concludes that this goal of making the two lists consistent does not "limit[] the Administrator's authority to establish
subcategories under this section, as appropriate."137 Accordingly,
the EPA argued:
Therefore, by its plain terms, section 112(c)(1) does not preclude basing subcategories on criteria other than those traditionally used under section 111 before 1990, or those used
after 1990 for sections 111 and 112. Moreover, while after
1990 we have principally used the traditional criteria to
define categories and subcategories, such use in general
does not restrict how we may define a subcategory in a specific case, "as appropriate," since each HAP-emitting industry presents its own unique situation and factors to be
considered. 138
An important question is whether the EPA's discretion to define
categories and subcategories under subsections 112(c)(1) and
112(d)(1) applies as well to 112(c)(9)(B)(i), which refers only to
the term "category," but does not mention the term "subcategory."
In light of its broad discretion under section 112 to define which
sources comprise a category or subcategory, the EPA argued that it
has implied authority under subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) to delist a
subcategory of sources emitting carcinogens from MACT standards
despite the absence of explicit language in that subsection providing such authorityY9 The Agency stated:
Section 112(c)(9) of the CAA allows us to delete categories
and subcategories from the list of HAP sources to be subject
to MACf standards under section 112(d) of the CAA, if
certain substantive criteria are met. (The EPA construes
this authority to apply to listed subcategories because doing
so is logical in the context of the general regulatory scheme
established by the statute, and is reasonable since section
112(c)(9)(B)(ii) expressly refers to subcategories.) To
delete a category or subcategory the Administrator must
make an initial demonstration that no source in the category
or subcategory: (1) Emits carcinogens in amounts that may
result in a lifetime cancer risk exceeding one in a million to
136

137

138
139

Id. at 45,989-90.
42 U.S.c. § 7412(c)(l).
PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,989 (internal citation omitted).
See id. at 45,944, 45,946, 45,984-85, 45,986--91.
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the individual most exposed; (2) emits noncarcinogens in
amounts that exceed a level which is adequate to provide an
ample margin of safety to protect public health; and (3)
emits any HAP or combination of HAP in amounts that will
result in an adverse environmental effect, as defined by section 112(a)(7) of the CAA. 14o

2.

Problems With the EPA's Claim of Broad Discretion Under
Subsections 112 (c)(1) and 112 (d) (1)

There are several problems with the EPA's interpretation that its
discretion under subsections 112(c)(I) or 112(d)(I) to define categories or subcategories implies that it has similar discretion under
subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i).141 In particular, subsection
112(c)(9)(B)(i)'s plain reference to the term "category" but omission of the term "subcategory" raises serious questions about the
extent of the EPA's authority to delist a subcategory of carcinogenic sources. 142 Neither subsection 112(c)(I) nor 112(d)(I) purports to expand the EPA's authority under subsection
112(c)(9)(B)(i).143
Although subsection 112(d)(I)'s first clause authorizes the EPA
to "distinguish among classes, types, and sizes of sources within a
category or subcategory in establishing [emission] standards ... ,"
the statute's second clause plainly states that the provision does not
authorize the EPA to take actions that cause delay in the compliance date for any standard applicable to any source under subsection 112(i).144 Because the PCWP rule effectively delays the
compliance date for all low-risk sources, the EPA's decision to
de list a subcategory of PCWP "low-risk" sources arguably contradicts the no-delay command of subsection 112(i).145 Furthermore,
the first clause of subsection 112(d)(I) authorizes the EPA to "distinguish among classes, types, and sizes of sources within a category or subcategory in establishing [emission] standards ... ," but
does not authorize the Agency to exempt individual sources from
emission standards by placing them into an exempt category or
subcategory.146
140
141
142
143
144
145

146

[d. at 45,946.
See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 34-35.
[d.
See id. at 36.
See id. at 35 (citing 42 U.S.c. § 7412(d)(1)(i)).
See id. at 35-36 (citing 42 U.S.c. § 7412(i)).
See id. at 37 n.83 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(1)).
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Moreover, by exempting "low-risk" sources, the PCWP Rule
arguably violates the command in subsections 112(c)(2) and
112(d)(1) that the Agency promulgate emission standards for all
major sources of air toxics. 147 Subsection 112(c)(2) states that,
"[f]or the categories and subcategories the Administrator lists, the
Administrator shall establish emissions standards under subsection
(d) of this section, according to the schedule in this subsection and
subsection (e) of this section."148 Similarly, subsection 112(d)(1)
states that "[t]he Administrator shall promulgate regulations establishing emission standards for each category or subcategory of
major sources and area sources of hazardous air pollutants listed
for regulation pursuant to subsection (c) and (e) of this section. "149
By indefinitely delaying the imposition of emission standards for
"low-risk" sources, the PCWP rule arguably contravenes subsection 112(c)(2) and 112(d)(1)'s requirement that the EPA promulgate emission standards for all categories and subcategories of
sources subject to MACT. 150 Therefore, the EPA's authority to
delist a subcategory or category from emission standards must
come from subsection 112(c)(9)(B) and not from either subsection
112(c)(2) or 112(d)(1). For example, if the EPA appropriately
delists a category of sources, then it would not need to apply otherwise applicable MACT standards to sources in the delisted category or subcategory.

3.

Is the EPA's Low-Risk Subcategory the Equivalent of
Exempting Individual Sources?

The PCWP Rule's methodology of allowing the Agency to place
individual sources into a low-risk subcategory if the individual
sources demonstrate that they are "low-risk" is questionable
because Congress in 1990 specifically rejected the EPA's request
that it have the authority to exempt individual sources from MACT
standards. 151 During the Senate debate on the 1990 Amendments,
Senator Durenberger stated that the congressional Conference
Committee in charge of reconciling the House and Senate bills, of
which Senator Durenberger was a member, specifically rejected a
See id. at 36-37 (citing 42 U.S.c. §§ 7412(c)(2), (d)(l».
42 U.S.c. § 7412(c)(2) (emphasis added); see PCWP Petition for Reconsideration,
supra note 22, at 36 (quoting 42 U.S.c. § 7412(c)(2».
149 42 U.S.c. § 7412(d)(1) (emphasis added); see PCWP Petition for Reconsideration,
supra note 22, at 36-37 (quoting 42 U.S.c. § 7412(d)(1».
150 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 36-37 (citing 42 U.S.c.
§§ 7412(c)(2), (d)(l».
151 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 36-57.
147

148
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proposal in the House Bill to allow the EPA the authority to
exempt individual sources. 152 In the PCWP rule, the EPA acknowledged Congress's refusal to give it authority to grant source-specific exemptions. The Agency rejected industry's request that the
Agency use its subsection 112(d)(4) authority to create alternative
emission standards for threshold pollutants, stating "[T]he legislative history of the 1990 Amendments to the CAA indicates that
Congress considered and rejected allowing us to grant such sourcespecific exemptions from the MACT flOOr."153 In light of Congress's rejection of giving the EPA source-specific exemptions, the
best interpretation of the EPA's delisting authority under subsection 112(c)(9)(B) is that the EPA may delist only an entire preexisting category or entire subcategory of sources provided that all
sources in the relevant category or subcategory are low-risk. The
Agency may not delist individual sources on a case-by-case basis.
The EPA's approach in the PCWP Rule of exempting individual
sources from a listed category based on their individual risk is
inconsistent with Congress's intent that subsection 112(c)(9)(B)
only allow the EPA to de list an entire pre-existing category or subcategory. The selection of individual sources based on risk is
equivalent in all essential respects to delisting individual sources on
a case-by-case basis. 154
•
The Petition quotes a March 4, 2002 draft memorandum from
the EPA's Office of General Counsel that concluded that Congress
did not intend the EPA to have the authority to exempt individual
sources from MACT requirements.
The conclusion that Congress did not intend to exempt individual low-risk sources is further supported by Congress's
rejection of a provision that would have allowed relaxed
standards for such individual low-risk sources. The House
Bill, H.R. 3030, would have allowed a source to comply with
an alternative emission limitation (in lieu of the technologybased standards otherwise required), if the source could
demonstrate that emissions meeting the alternative limita152 Senator Durenberger stated, "The fourth set of alternatives reviewed in the paper
concern source-by-source exemptions from MACT based on risk assessments, a provision
contained in the House bill. The authority for such exemptions was not present in the
Senate bill, and the House receded to the Senate on this point. The provision was deleted
in conference." See supra note 97, at S16,932 (remarks of Senator Durenberger); PCWP
Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 37-38.
153 PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,984; PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra
note 22, at 38.
154 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 37 (discussing individual
source exemption in PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 46,012, 46,040).
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tion would present a negligible risk to public health. Senator Durenberger explained that this source-specific riskbased exemption was rejected by Congress. 155
The Draft aGC Memorandum did not become public until the
Los Angeles Times published it on May 21, 2004, more than two
months after the public comment period closed for the PCWP Rule
on March 10, 2004. 156 Responding to questions about the Memorandum from Los Angeles Times reporters, Jeffrey R. Holmstead,
an Assistant Administrator of the EPA who was then the highestranking Agency official in charge of air issues, acknowledged the
issue was debated by EPA lawyers, but stated, "[a]t the end of the
day, the agency determined it was something we did have the
authority to dO."157 The Memorandum was not adopted as an official interpretation by the EPA, but it does raise troubling questions
about whether the PCWP Rule violates congressional intent to
deny the EPA the authority to exempt individual sources from
MACT.
The PCWP Rule tries to distinguish between Congress's denial
of authority for the EPA to impose weaker standards than MACT
for individual sources, at least under subsection 112(d)( 4 ),158 and
the EPA's new policy of using risk to exempt individual "low-risk"
sources as part of a "low-risk" subcategory" through the subsection
112(c)(9)(B) delisting process.
Our approach does not equate to one that Congress considered and rejected that would have allowed source-by-source
exemptions from MACT based on individualized demonstrations that such sources are low risk. This is because, con~
trary to that approach, we rely upon the application of
specific eligibility criteria that are defined in advance of any
source's application to be included in the low-risk PCWP
subcategory, in much the same way as any other applicability determination process works. Moreover, in response to
the assertion that our approach nevertheless conflicts with
155 PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 38 (quoting Draft Memorandum, EPA Office of General Counsel, 10-11 (Mar. 4, 2002».
156 Alan C. Miller & Tom Hamburger, EPA Relied on Industry for Plywood Plant Pollution Rule, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 2004, at Al (discussing EPA memorandum questioning
authority of the EPA to exempt individual sources from MACT requirements); PCWP
Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 39 n.85; PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at
45,946 (stating "[t]he public comment period lasted from January 9, 2003, to March 10,
2003.").
157 Miller & Hamburger, supra note 156, at Al.
158 PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,984; PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra
note 22, at 38.
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legislative history rejecting a similar (but not identical)
approach Congress considered under CAA section 112, this
legislative history is not substantive legislative history demonstrating that Congress voted against relief from MACT in
this situation-there is no such history. The commenters
point to a provision in the House bill that was not enacted
but that would have provided in certain situations for caseby-case exemptions for low-risk sources. There is no evidence that this provision was ever debated, considered, or
voted upon, so its not being enacted is not probative of congressional intent concerning our ability to identify and delist
a group of low-risk PCWP affected sources. Instead, it is
reasonable to assume that, had Congress been aware in 1990
of the possibility that an identifiable group of PCWP
affected sources is low risk, while that group does not correspond to traditional criteria differentiating categories and
subcategories, Congress would have expressly, rather than
implicitly, authorized our action here. 159

The Draft OGC Memorandum, however, specifically argues that
Congress in 1990 would have rejected any source-by-source
exemption based solely on risk and not on differences in technology, equipment, or types of emissions.
The statute and legislative history demonstrates that, for
non-threshold pollutants, Congress did not intend to regulate only high-risk sources or to regulate sources only to the
point where they meet the risk criteria of 112(c)(9) or
112(f) . . .. [S]ubcategorization based on risk would effectively allow source-specific delisting under 112(c)(9). Such
an outcome is not contemplated by the language of section
112(c)(9) and was expressly rejected by Congress in drafting
section 112.160

Despite the Agency's assertions in the PCWP Rule that its delisting process is somehow different from the source-specific exemption proposal Congress rejected in 1990, the EPA's delisting
process is virtually the same type of source-by-source exemption. 161
The PCWP Rule acknowledges that it uses a source-by-source
exemption process to determine which sources fall into the low-risk
159 See PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,990; PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra
note 22, at 39.
160 PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 40 (quoting Draft Memorandum, EPA Office of General Counsel, 10-11 (Mar. 4, 2002)) (emphasis added).
161 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 40.
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subcategory.162 Additionally, the Rule concedes that risk is the
sole basis for determining which sources to delist, and, therefore
exempt from MACT standards. 163 Because the EPA's PCWP Rule
exempts individual low-risk PCWP sources and then places them
into a low-risk subcategory, the approach is tantamount to the
power of individual exemption that Congress refused to grant to
the Agency in the 1990 Amendments. 164 The EPA itself conceded
in the PCWP Rule that "the legislative history of the 1990 Amendments to the CAA indicates that Congress considered and rejected
allowing us to grant such source-specific exemptions from the
MACT floor. "165 The Supreme Court has considered whether
Congress specifically rejected a proposal in determining the proper
interpretation of a statute. 166 Accordingly, the EPA's assertion
that Congress in 1990 would have accepted its delisting approach
even though it had rejected a very similar proposal for source-bysource exemptions is not credible. Courts should reject the EPA's
interpretation that it may evaluate individual sources and then
place them into a low-risk category.167 Instead, the EPA should
define categories or subcategories based on traditional technological, process, output, and product factors, and then delist a category
only if all sources in the category are low-risk.

162 See PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,990 ("[T]he approach we are taking for identifying additional low-risk PCWP affected sources is fully consistent with the approach we
have long taken in identifying, on a case-by-case basis and subject to appropriate review,
whether individual sources are members of a category or subcategory subject to standards
adopted under CAA section 111 and 112."); PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra
note 22, at 40 n.87.
163 See PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,990 ("[T]he criteria for the low-risk subcategory
we are delisting are based solely on risk and not on technological differences in equipment
or emissions."); PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 40-41.
164 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 38-41.
165 See PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,984; PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra
note 22, at 41.
166 See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Servo V. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
441-443 (1987) (stating Court considered Congress's explicit rejection of provision in
determining interpretation of statute); PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22,
at 41-42.
167 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n V. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (holding Agency rule arbitrary and capricious under Administrative Procedure Act
where agency "offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
before the Agency"); PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 42.
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VI.
A.

Is SUBSECfION 112(c)(9)(B)(I)'S USE OF THE TERM
"CATEGORY" BINDING OR A DRAFTING ERROR?

The EPA's Drafting Error Argument

The plain language of subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) explicitly provides the EPA with authority to exempt only whole categories of
sources emitting cancer-causing chemicals, if none of the sources in
the category pose greater than a one-in-one-million risk of cancer
to the most exposed individual. 168 In its PCWP Rule, however, the
EPA argues that the omission of the term "subcategory" in subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) was "nothing more than a drafting error." The
EPA in its PCWP Rule responded to a comment that it did not
have authority under subsection 112(c)(9)(B) to delete a subcategory of low-risk sources of carcinogens:
Regarding the comment that Congress did not expressly
provide relief for carcinogen-emitting low-risk groups of
sources within the PCWP category other than as an entire
category, we construe the provisions of CAA section
112(c)(9) to apply to listed subcategories as well as to categories. This construction is logical in the context of the general regulatory scheme established by the statute, and it is
the most reasonable one because section 112(c)(9)(B)(ii)
expressly refers to subcategories. Under a literal reading of
section 112(c)(9)(B), no subcategory could ever be delisted,
notwithstanding the explicit reference to subcategories,
since the introductory language of section 112(c)(9)(B) provides explicit authority to only delist categories. Such a
reading makes no sense, at the very least because Congress
plainly assumed we might also delist another collection of
sources besides either categories or subcategories, even in
the case of sources of carcinogens. Both sections
112(c)(9)(B)(i) and (ii) refer additionally to groups of
sources in the case of area sources as being eligible for
delisting, even though only a category of sources is specifically identified as eligible for delisting in the introductory
language of section 112(c)(9)(B). In light of the broader
congressional purpose behind the delisting authority, we
interpret the absence of explicit references to subcategories
in this introductory language and in section 112(c)(9)(B)(i)
as representing nothing more than a drafting error. 169
168
169

See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(c)(9)(B)(i).
See PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,990.

114

Virginia Environmental Law Journal

[Vol. 24:75

In other words, the EPA contends that the omission of the term
"subcategory" is the result of an alleged scrivener's error. 170
B.

Courts Narrowly Apply the Scrivener's Error Doctrine

The federal courts have recognized an inherent judicial authority
to correct obvious clerical mistakes in a statute, accepting the doctrine of scrivener's error. l71 However, the federal courts have also
adopted a narrow approach to that corrective power to avoid
usurping legislative authority. Courts use the doctrine where
"there is only the remotest possibility that any such clerical mistake
reflected a deliberate legislative compromise. "172 The Supreme
Court has stated that when courts interpret a statute they "must
presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there."173 That said, the Court has
recognized an exception to the general rule, stating: "[t]he plain
meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the rare
cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a
result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters. In
such cases, the intention of the drafters, rather than the strict language, controls."174 The Supreme Court will employ the scriv170 There are various definitions of the term "scrivener's error." See, e.g., United States
Nat'l Bank v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 462 (1993) (defining "scrivener's error" as "a mistake made by someone unfamiliar with the law's object and
design"); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MAlTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 20 (1997) (defining "scrivener's error" as a situation where "on the very face of the
statute it is clear to the reader that a mistake of expression (rather than of legislative
wisdom) has been made"); Michael S. Fried, A Theory of Scrivener's Error, 52 RUTGERS L.
REv. 589, 593-94 (2000) (stating '''[s]crivener's error' refers to a typographical mistake or
other error of a clerical nature in the drafting of a document," but discussing other definitions of the term).
171 See, e.g., 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 47.36, at 277 (5th ed. 1992) ("A majority of cases permit the substitution of one word for
another if necessary to carry out the legislative intent or express clearly manifested meaning."); Fried, supra note 170, at 589, 594-99; John Copeland Nagle, Corrections Day, 43
UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1288 (1996) ("Almost all courts will correct a 'scrivener's error."').
172 John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2459 n.265
(2003) (explaining scrivener's error doctrine); accord Fried, supra note 170, at 603-04 (stating "courts generally will correct a scrivener's error only if the literal meaning of the statute would otherwise be so bizarre as to be unreasonable. Indeed, the doctrine must be so
restricted, for in most cases the absurdity of the statute as written is the primary evidence
that a drafting mistake has occurred") (emphasis added). The varying approaches of state
courts to the scrivener's error doctrine are beyond the scope of this article. See generally
Fried, supra note 170, at 589-605 (discussing varying approaches of several different state
supreme courts to the scrivener's error doctrine).
173 Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-254 (1992).
174 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
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ener's error doctrine to correct otherwise plain statutory language
only if there is "overwhelm[ing] evidence from the structure, language, and subject matter" of the statute demonstrating that Congress must have intended to use a different word than that in the
statute. 175
Following the Supreme Court's precedent, the D.C. Circuit has
emphasized that the scrivener's error doctrine is a narrow tool to
be used by courts only where there are very strong reasons to reinterpret a statute's normally controlling language to avoid an
absurd result or a construction that is clearly contrary to the likely
intent of Congress:
Reading a statute contrary to its seemingly clear meaning is
permissible "[i]f 'the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its
drafters.'" We will not, however, invoke this rule to ratify
an interpretation that abrogates the enacted statutory text
absent an extraordinarily convincing justification: "The
court's role is not to 'correct' the text so that it better serves
the statute's purposes, for it is the function of the political
branches not only to define the goals but also to choose the
means for reaching them .... Therefore, for the EPA to
avoid a literal interpretation at Chevron step one, it must
show either that, as a matter of historical fact, Congress did
not mean what it appears to have said, or that, as a matter of
logic and statutory structure, it almost surely could not have
meant it.,,176

In 2003, the D.C. Circuit stated that it will not invoke the scrivener's error doctrine as long as there is a "plausible interpretation"
175 See Nat'l Bank, 508 U.S. at 462. Even Justice Scalia who is a proponent of textualist
statutory interpretation acknowledges the possibility of deviating from the text if there is
strong evidence of a scrivener's error. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513
U.S. 64, 82 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I have been willing, in the case of civil statutes,
to acknowledge a doctrine of 'scrivener's error' that permits a court to give an unusual
(though not unheard-of) meaning to a word which, if given its normal meaning, would
produce an absurd and arguably unconstitutional result."); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach.
Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (concluding term "defendant" in
Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) refers only to criminal defendants and suggesting that
drafters had inadvertently left out qualification "criminal" defendant); SCALIA, supra note
170, at 20 (1997) (recognizing exception from textualism for '''scrivener's error"'); Bradford Mank, Legal Context: Reading Statutes in Light of Prevailing Legal Precedent, 34
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 815, 829 n.77 (2002) (discussing Justice Scalia's use of "'scrivener's error"
doctrine); Manning, supra note 172, at 2459 n.265; John F. Manning, Textualism and the
Equity a/the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 116-17 (2001).
176 Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted).
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to the literal statutory language. I77 In Appalachian Power Co. v.
EPA,178 the D.C. Circuit found a scrivener's error where an internal cross-reference in the Act to § 110(a)(2)(D)(ii) only made
sense if the reference was to § 110(a)(2)(D)(i).179 The Appalachian
Power decision limited the doctrine to cases providing an "extraordinarily convincing justification. "180
C.

Refuting the EPA's Drafting Error Argument

As will be demonstrated below, the EPA fails to meet its heavy
burden of demonstrating that the omission of the term "subcategory" from subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) is a scrivener's error. That
is because there are plausible reasons why Congress may haven
chosen to allow the EPA to delist subcategories of less harmful
non-carcinogens, but not to de list subcategories of carcinogens.

Logic is Not Enough

1.

The EPA's response consists of four somewhat overlapping arguments to support its drafting error conclusion. However, none of
them are sufficient to overcome the strong presumption that courts
should follow a statute's plain language. 181 First, the EPA contends
that "This construction is logical in the context of the general regulatory scheme established by the statute .... "182 It is not enough,
however, that there is an alternative logical construction of a statute. A court may disregard the plain language of a statute only if
there are strong reasons to do so, including instances where the
plain language is clearly illogical or appears to contradict Congress's almost certain intent. 183

2.

The Most Reasonable Construction Does Not Prove a
Drafting Error

Second, the EPA contends that its interpretation that Congress
inadvertently omitted the term "subcategories" in subsection
112(c)(9)(B)(i) "is the most reasonable [construction] because section 112(c)(9)(B)(ii) expressly refers to subcategories."184 Even if
177

178
179
ISO

Williams Cos. v. F.E.R.C., 345 F.3d 910, 912 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
Appalachian Power Co., 249 F.3d at 1032.
[d. at 1041.
[d.

PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 46-49.
See PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,990.
183 See Nat'l Bank of Or., 508 U.S. at 462; Williams Cos., 345 F.3d at 912; Appalachian
Power Co., 249 F.3d at 1041; PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 45-46.
184 See PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,990.
181

182
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the EPA is correct that its interpretation is the most reasonable
construction, the Agency's drafting error argument still fails if
there are other plausible interpretations that would explain Congress's omission of the term "subcategory" in 112(c)(9)(B)(i).185 In
light of Congress's often different treatment of carcinogens and
non-carcinogens in subsection 112, including Congress's decision to
use the ample margin of safety standard for non-carcinogens in
subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(ii) and the one-in-one-million standard for
carcinogens in subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i), there is a plausible argument that Congress understood the distinction between categories
and subcategories and consciously omitted the term subcategories
in the latter subsection because carcinogens are more dangerous. 186
Similarly, subsection 112(c)(9)(A) permits delisting only for a
"source category."187 Additionally, the EPA's second argument
does not address the possibility that Congress committed a drafting
error by including the term "subcategory" in subsection
112(c)(9)(B)(ii).188

3.

A Literal Reading of Subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) is Reasonable
and Does Not Contradict Subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(ii)

Third, the EPA argues that "[u]nder a literal reading of section
112(c)(9)(B), no subcategory could ever be delisted, notwithstanding the explicit reference to subcategories, since the introductory
language of section 112(c)(9)(B) provides explicit authority to only
delist categories."189 The EPA does not explain why such an interpretation is absurd or implausible which is the standatd used by
federal courts in deciding whether the scrivener's error doctrine
applies. 190 It is possible that Congress did not wish the EPA to
have the discretion to exempt some subcategories of carcinogenic
sources through a delisting process while subjecting other carcinogenic sources in the source category to MACT rules. 191 It is at least
plausible that Congress intended to authorize the EPA to delist
185 Williams Cos., 345 F.3d at 912 (stating that court would not find scrivener's error if
there is a plausible interpretation of the statute's plain language); PCWP Petition for
Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 44-51 (arguing the EPA's claim that absence of the term
"subcategory" in 42 U.S.c. § 112(c)(9)(B)(i) is a drafting error is wrong because there are
plausible reasons why Congress chose to omit that term).
186 PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 47.
187 42 U.S.c. § 7412(c)(9)(A).
188 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 47.
189 See PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,990.
190 Appalachian Power Co., 249 F.3d at 1041.
191 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 47.
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carcinogenic sources only if every carcinogenic source in an entire
category posed low-risk; an all-or-nothing approach.l92
The EPA's claim that there is an internal contradiction between
subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(ii)'s reference to both "categories" and
"subcategories" and subsection 112(c)(9)(B)'s reference to only
"categories" does not demonstrate a similar contradiction between
subsections 112(c)(9)(B)(ii) and 112(c)(9)(B)(i)'s different treatment of carcinogens and non-carcinogens. 193 One commenter
argued that "the absence of the term 'subcategories' in section
112(c)(9)(B)(i) indicates a Congressional choice not to permit the
Administrator to delist subcategories of sources under subsection
112(c)(9)(B)."194 That commenter also stated that the omission of
the term "subcategory" in 112(c)(9)(B)(i) "is consistent with Congress'[ s] decision to require a higher standard to delist categories
that emit carcinogens."195 According to that commenter, the subsection 112(c)(9)(B )(ii) requirement of less than one-in-one-million lifetime cancer risk for the most exposed individual "is a
higher and more specific standard than the standard for other
HAP[s],"196 Similarly, subsection 112(d)(4) provides the EPA with
the authority to promulgate alternative emission standards for
threshold pollutants, usually understood as only non-carcinogens in
1990, as long as the alternative standard provides an ample margin
of safety.197 However, subsection 112(d)(4) does not allow alternatives for non-threshold carcinogens, which in 1990 most scientists
believed included all carcinogens. 198 Accordingly, because Congress in several portions of section 112 treated carcinogens and
non-carcinogens differently, it is plausible that Congress intended
subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i), unlike subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(ii), to
prohibit the Agency from delisting subcategories of carcinogens
even if the Agency may de list subcategories of non-carcinogens.

192
193
194
195

196
197
198

See id.
See id.
PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,987.
[d.
[d.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(4).
[d.
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4.

Subsection 112(c)(9)(B)'s Approach for Delisting "Area
Sources" Does Not Prove that the Omission of the Term
"Subcategory" in Subsection 112 (c)(9) (B)(i) is
Absurd

Fourth and finally, the EPA argues that a "literal" reading of
subsection 112(c)(9)(B) is absurd because Congress allowed the
Agency to delist either categories or subcategories of area sources,
even in the case of carcinogens, but did not do so under subsection
112(c)(9)(B)(i) for major sources of carcinogens. 199 Both subsections 112(c)(9)(B)(i) and (ii) refer to the Agency's authority to
delist "groups of sources in the case of area sources," even though
only a category of sources is specifically identified as eligible for
delisting in the introductory language of section 112(c)(9)(B).200
Although Congress could have done a better job in drafting the
introductory language of subsection 112(c)(9)(B) by including a
reference to area sources, the clear statutory language in subsections 112(c)(9)(B)(i) and 112(c)(9)(B)(ii) that provides the EPA
with the authority to delist a "group of sources in the case of area
sources" is not absurd, but simply treats area sources differently
from major sources. 201 There are plausible reasons why Congress
might provide the Agency with more discretion to delist small area
sources that are generally less dangerous than "major" sources of
air toxics. Congress exempted area sources from residual risk
requirements 202 and also allowed the EPA to apply less stringent,
alternative GACT technology-based requirements or management
practices for area sources. 203 The statute's distinction between area
and major sources is plausible and does not prove that Congress
made a drafting error in subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) by omitting the
term "subcategory. "204

5.

The EPA's Drafting Error Argument Fails

The EPA's four interrelated arguments do not meet its burden of
demonstrating "overwhelming evidence from the structure, language, and subject matter of" section 112 necessary to prove that
Congress made a scrivener's error not just once, but twice, in subSee PCWP Rule, supra note 18, at 45,990.
See id.
201 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 48.
202 See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(f)(5).
203 See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(d)(5) (providing EPA Administrator with discretion to use
alternative GACf or management practices for area sources).
204 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 48.
199

200
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sections 112(c)(9)(B) and 112(c)(9)(B)(i).205 Congress used only
the term "category" in both subsections. 206 It is unlikely that Congress made the same mistake twice. 207 The EPA presents no evidence from the Act's legislative history to demonstrate a drafting
error in subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i),z08 On the contrary, the limited
legislative history addressing subsection 112(c)(9)(B )(i) refers only
to categories and not to subcategories. 209
There are plausible reasons why Congress may have intentionally omitted the term "subcategory" in subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i)
even though the same term is included in subsection
112(c)(9)(B)(ii) for non-carcinogens,zlo Subsection 112( c)(9)(B)(i)
requires "a higher and more specific standard" of proof to delist
categories that emit carcinogens (a one-in-one-million lifetime cancer risk for the most exposed individual) than subsection
112(c)(9)(B)(ii) requires for deleting categories or subcategories of
threshold air toxics (an "ample margin of safety standard)."211
Congress may have been concerned about the difficult judgment
calls the EPA would have to make in delisting some subcategories
of carcinogenic sources, but not others.212 If every source in a category emitting carcinogens has a risk less than one-in-one-million to
the most exposed individual, then the source category as a whole is
low-risk and delisting is appropriate. 213 Accordingly, Congress
may have deliberately excluded subcategories of sources emitting
carcinogens under subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i).214
In light of section 112's frequent distinction between carcinogens
and non-carcinogens, the EPA fails to prove that "the literal appli205 Nat'l Bank of Oregon, 508 U.S. at 462; see also Appalachian Power Co., 249 F.3d at
1041 ("[F]or the EPA to avoid a literal interpretation at Chevron step one, it must show
either that, as a matter of historical fact, Congress did not mean what it appears to have
said, or that, as a matter of logic and statutory structure, it almost surely could not have
meant it.") (internal citation omitted); PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22,
at 49-50.
206 Nat'l Bank of Oregon, 508 U.S. at 462; see also Appalachian Power Co., 249 F.3d at
1041; PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 49-50.
207 Nat'l Bank of Oregon, 508 U.S. at 462; see also Appalachian Power Co., 249 F.3d at
1041; PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 49-50.
208 PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 49.
209 136 CONGo REc. S2030, S2109 ("MACf standards are not required for source categories that pose less than a 1-in-1,000,OOO risk of cancer."); PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 49.
210 PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 49-50.
211

[d.

212

See id. at 49-50.
See id. at 50-51.
See id. at 48.

213

214
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cation of [the Act] will produce a result demonstrably at odds with
the intentions of its drafters."215 Additionally, Congress's use of
the term "subcategory" in subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(ii) demonstrates that Congress knew how to explicitly employ that term if it
wanted it to be included. 216 Accordingly, a judge would likely conclude that subsection 112(c)(9)(B )(i) does not authorize the EPA
to delist a subcategory of carcinogenic sources, but only an entire
category and only if every source in that larger source category
poses a lifetime risk of cancer to the most exposed individual of
less than one-in-one-million. 217
D.

Does the EPA's Interpretation of Subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i)
Deserve Deference under Chevron?

In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., the Supreme Court held that, if a statute is silent or ambiguous about the particular issue in question, courts should defer to an
agency's reasonable interpretation of that statute if it is issued as
part of a valid rule, because it is presumed that Congress delegated
interpretive power to an agency with the authority to issue rules
having the "force of law."218 If the language of a statute is clear,
however, a court will not defer to the agency's interpretation of a
statute, but will instead interpret and follow the plain language of
the statute. 219 If a statute's language is clear, a court will ignore the
statute's plain language and instead follow an agency's contrary
interpretation only if the agency can "show either that, as a matter
PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 49-50.
Id. at 47-50.
217 Id. at 49-50.
218 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 865-66 (1984) (stating courts should defer to Agency's interpretation of ambiguous statutory language if interpretation is reasonable and stressing that
executive agencies have more appropriate role in defining ambiguous statutory language
because they possess greater substantive expertise than courts, and agencies are politically
accountable through elections, unlike courts); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 215, 226-31 (2001) (explaining that Chevron doctrine requires courts to defer to
Agency's reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statute or fill "gap" in a silent statute
where Congress has delegated to Agency authority to issue regulations carrying "force of
law"); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 625-26 (1996) (describing presumption
established in Chevron that silence in statute shows intent of Congress to leave act of interpretation in hands of Agency in charge of administering act); Thomas w. Merrill & Kristin
E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 passim (2001) (explaining that Chevron
fundamentally expanded deference of courts to Agency interpretations of statutes by
presuming gaps or ambiguities in statute as reflecting implicit congressional intent to delegate interpretive authority to Agency).
219 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 ("If a statute's language is clear and specific, a court
must reject an agency interpretation that is contrary to that language.")
215

216
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of historical fact, Congress did not mean what it appears to have
said, or that, as a matter of logic and statutory structure, it almost
surely could not have meant it. "220 Even if a court finds that a
statute contains a scrivener's error, the court does not defer to the
agency's interpretation of the statute, but instead allows the agency
to "'deviate no further from the statute than is needed to protect
congressional intent.' "221
A court must follow a statute's plain language and not defer to
an agency's contrary interpretation unless an agency can present
strong evidence that the plain language is likely a drafting error.
The EPA in the PCWP Rule fails to present any convincing evidence or "historical fact[ s]" demonstrating that Congress made a
drafting error in subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) when it included only
the term "category," but not the term "subcategory." Because
there are plausible reasons why Congress might have treated delisting differently for carcinogens and non-carcinogens, a court should
not find that Congress made a scrivener's error. In the absence of
convincing evidence that Congress made a scrivener's error, a
court must follow the plain language of subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i)
and limit the Agency's delisting authority to entire categories of
carcinogenic sources. 222 Because the statute is clear and there is no
clear evidence of a drafting error, a court should not give Chevron
deference to the EPA's flawed interpretation in the PCWP Rule
that subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) contains a drafting error and should
include the term "subcategory."223
VII.

CONCLUSION

The EPA's claim that it has the authority to exempt subcategories of so-called "low-risk" carcinogenic sources is significant
because it could expand the PCWP MACT rule to many other
industrial MACT categories or subcategories and exempt poten220 Appalachian Power Co, 249 F.3d at 1041; see PCWP Petition for Reconsideration,
supra note 22, at 44-46, 49-50.
221 See Appalachian Power Co., 249 F.3d at 1043-44 ("We do not give an agency alleging
a scrivener's error the benefit of Chevron step two deference, by which the court credits
any reasonable construction of an ambiguous statute. Rather, the agency may deviate no
further from the statute than is needed to protect congressional intent." (citing Mova
Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060,1068 (D.C. Cir. 1998))); PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 44-45; see also United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513
U.S. 64, 82 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating courts should not "stretch" the doctrine of
scrivener's error "so as to give [a] problematic text a meaning it cannot possibly bear").
222 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 ("If a statute's language is clear and specific, a court
must reject an agency interpretation that is contrary to that language.").
223 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 45-46, 49-50.
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tially thousands of sources governed by MACT standards in dozens
of industries. In the PCWP Rule alone, the EPA is seeking to
exempt over one-half of the sources in the PCWP industry-147
sources.z24 If courts accept the EPA's scrivener's error argument
that Congress inadvertently omitted the term' "subcategory" from
subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) then the EPA will have the effective
power to exempt individual sources from MACT on a case-by-case
basis. This is a power which Congress explicitly refused to give to
the EPA in the 1990 Amendments. 225
In January 2005, Republican Senators James Inhofe (OK) and
George Voinovich (OH) inserted language in their proposed
"Clear Skies" legislation, Senate Bill 131, which primarily seeks to
approve President Bush's controversial three-pollutant plan for the
trading of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxides, and mercury, to explicitly approve the PCWP rule as well as three other low-risk exemptions from MACT. 226 At the Senate Environment Committee
hearing on the bill, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-NY) criticized the MACT exemption provision for potentially allowing
sources to release thousands of tons of carcinogens into the air.227
To increase the bill's chances of passage, in February 2005, Senators Inhofe, Voinovich, and Christopher Bond (R-MO) amended
the bill to eliminate the PCWP exemption provision before the
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 38-56 (arguing that Congress in 1990 explicitly refused to grant to the EPA the authority to exempt individual
sources from MACf standards, but that the EPA's low-risk exemption program in PCWP
Rule effectively gave the Agency an equivalent power).
226 S. 131, 109th Congo § 407(j)(I)(A)(ii) (Jan. 24, 2005) (creating exemption from
MACf for sources covered by plywood rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,943); Darren Samuelsohn, Air
Pollution; Voinovich sets deadline for dropping Clear Skies debate, Env't & Energy Daily,
Jan. 27, 2005, available at 2005 WL 62125687 ("John Walke, a senior attorney at the Natural Resources Defense Council, said the 'opt-in' language added by Inhofe and Voinovich
would allow four major industries to be exempt from existing U.S. EPA toxic air pollution
control technology requirements, some of which are currently being litigated by environmental groups who claim the agency rules are not stringent enough. Industrial, commercial
and institutional boilers and process heaters, plywood and composite wood panel manufacturers, reciprocating internal combustion engines and stationary combustion turbines are
all given specific regulatory relief in the GOP's new version of Clear Skies.").
227 Clear Skies Act of 2005: Hearings on S. 131 Before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works, 109th Congo (Feb. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 131]
(quoting remarks of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton: "Section 407(j) of S. 131 includes a
provision that carves out exemptions from current Clean Air Act requirements for four
entire source categories, more than 70,000 units. This removes these units from Clean Air
Act regulations for hazardous air pollutants, including carcinogens like benzene, probable
carcinogens like formaldehyde ... "); Senate Republicans Drop Air Toxics Waiver in Clear
Skies Bill, INSIDE EPA, Feb. 15, 2005.
224
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Committee's February 16, 2005 markup of the bilp28 Accordingly,
the D.C. Circuit will hear the case challenging the PCWP rule
unless the EPA grants the petition for reconsideration. On July 29,
2005, in response to the petition, the EPA published a Notice of
Reconsideration with a forty-five day public comment period, ending September 12, 2005. 229 As this article went to publication, the
EPA had not yet published its final rule and notice of final action
regarding the Notice of Reconsideration, and the D.C. Circuit had
not yet decided the case.
Courts should reject the EPA's scrivener's error argument that
Congress inadvertently omitted the term "subcategory" from subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i). The EPA has failed to meet its heavy burden of proving that Congress must have made a scrivener's error in
omitting the term "subcategory" from subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i).
Based on Section 112's history, language and structure, there are
plausible reasons why Congress may have allowed the deletion of
subcategories of non-carcinogens, but refused to do the same for
carcinogens, which Congress in the 1990 Amendments assumed
had no threshold. The plain language of subsection
112(c)(9)(B)(i), which allows the EPA to de list an entire "category" of sources emitting carcinogens only if every source in that
category poses a lifetime risk of cancer of less than one-in-onemillion, is reasonable. 230 Accordingly, the EPA may not exempt
subcategories of sources releasing carcinogens under
112(c)(9)(B)(i). The PCWP Rule is invalid to the extent that the
Agency authorized the delisting of a subcategory of low-risk carcinogenic sources.

228 The amendment also eliminated MACT exemptions for two other industrial categories: (1) reciprocating internal combustion engines; and (2) stationary combustion turbines.
See Hearings on S. 131, supra note 227.
229 The Notice of Reconsideration summarized the eight arguments that the Petition had
made challenging the risk-based portion of the final rule, including the following: (1) Risk
assessment methodology; (2) background pollution and co-located emission sources; (3)
the dose-response value used for formaldehyde; (4) costs and benefits of establishing a
low-risk subcategory; (5) ecological risk; (6) legal basis for the risk-based approach; (7)
MACT compliance date for affected sources previously qualifying for the low-risk subcategory; and (8) title V implementation mechanism for the risk-based approach. EPA,
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Plywood and Composite Wood
Products; List of Hazardous Air Pollutants, Lesser Quantity Designations, Source Category List; Reconsideration, 70 Fed. Reg. 43,826, 43,826-29 (July 29, 2005). The petition
also raised concerns regarding the final rule's start-up, shutdown, and malfunction (SSM)
provisions that are beyond the scope of this Article. /d. at 43828-30.
230 See PCWP Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 22, at 49-51.

